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Abstract
This paper presents a general framework for unifying functional interpretations.
It is based on families of parameters allowing for different degrees of freedom on
the design of the interpretation. In this way we are able to generalise previous
work on unifying functional interpretations, by including in the unification the
more recent bounded and Herbrandized functional interpretations.
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1. Introduction
Since Go¨del [16] published his functional (“Dialectica”) interpretation in 1958,
various other functional interpretations have been proposed2. These include Kreisel’s
modified realizability [20], the Diller-Nahm variant of the Dialectica interpreta-
tion [4], Stein’s family of interpretations [27], and more recently, the bounded
functional interpretation [11], the bounded modified realizability [10], and “Her-
brandized” versions of modified realizability and the Dialectica [3]. In view of
this picture, several natural questions arise: How are these different interpreta-
tions related to each other? What is the common structure behind all of them?
Are there any other interpretations out there waiting to be discovered?
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1The author acknowledges the support of FCT - Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia un-
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These questions were addressed by the second author (and various co-authors)
in a series of papers on unifying functional interpretations. Starting with a uni-
fication of interpretations of intuitionistic logic [21], which was followed by var-
ious analysis of functional interpretations within the finer setting of linear logic
[12, 22, 23, 24], a proposal on how functional interpretations could actually be
combined in so-called hybrid functional interpretations [17, 25], and the inclu-
sion of truth variants in the unification [14].
Functional interpretations associate with each formula A a new formula |A|xy
where x and y are fresh tuples of variables. Intuitively, x captures the “positive”
quantifications in A, while y captures the “negative” quantifications. This is done
in such a way that, in a suitable system, the truth of A is equivalent to that of
∃x∀y|A|xy . The key insight which arises from the programme of “unifying func-
tional interpretations” is that we have some degree of freedom when choosing the
interpretation of the exponentials of linear logic !A and ?A. For instance, we can
take
|!A|xy :≡ !|A|
x
y (giving rise to the Dialectica interpretation)
|!A|xa :≡ !∀y ∈ a|A|
x
y (giving rise to the Diller-Nahm interpretation)
|!A|x :≡ !∀y|A|xy (giving rise to modified realizability)
|!A|x :≡ !∀y|A|xy ⊗ !A (giving rise to modified realizability with truth)
and so on...
showing that each of these interpretations only differ in the way they treat the
contraction axiom. In particular, in the pure fragment of linear logic all these
interpretations coincide!
So, it makes sense to introduce an abstract bounded quantification ∀x ⊏τ a A,
capturing this degree of freedom on the design of a functional interpretation, and
to try to isolate the properties of this parameter which ensure the soundness of
the interpretation. With this one is able to define a “unifying functional inter-
pretation” which when instantiated gave rise to several of the existing functional
interpretations, including the Dialectica interpretation, modified realizability (its
q- and truth variants), Stein’s family of interpretations, and the Diller-Nahm inter-
pretation [21, 24]. This process led to the design of a “Diller-Nahm with truth”
interpretation [14], which at the time was not thought to be possible.
But the unifying functional interpretation programme has so far been unable
to capture the two more recent families of functional interpretations, namely the
bounded functional interpretations [6, 9, 10, 11], and the Herbrandized functional
interpretations [3, 8].
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(id)
A ⊢ A
(efq)
Γ,⊥ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A ∆, A ⊢ B
(cut)
Γ,∆ ⊢ B
Γ, A, B,∆ ⊢ C
(per)
Γ, B, A,∆ ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A ∆ ⊢ B
(⊗R)
Γ,∆ ⊢ A ⊗ B
Γ, A, B ⊢ C
(⊗L)
Γ, A ⊗ B ⊢ C
Γ, A ⊢ B
(⊸R)
Γ ⊢ A⊸ B
Γ ⊢ A ∆, B ⊢ C
(⊸L)
Γ,∆, A⊸ B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ A
(∀R, x < FV(Γ))
Γ ⊢ ∀xA
Γ, A[t/x] ⊢ B
(∀L)
Γ,∀xA ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A[t/x]
(∃R)
Γ ⊢ ∃xA
Γ, A ⊢ B
(∃L, x < FV(Γ, B))
Γ,∃xA ⊢ B
Γ, !A, !A ⊢ B
(con)
Γ, !A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ B
(wkn)
Γ, A ⊢ B
!Γ ⊢ A
(!R)
!Γ ⊢!A
Γ, A ⊢ B
(!L)
Γ, !A ⊢ B
Table 1: Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Affine Logic AL
In this paper we propose a framework for a more general unification, introduc-
ing other families of parameters which allow for different interpretations of typed
quantifications. We demonstrate that, when devising a functional interpretation,
we in fact have two crucial degrees of freedom: we can choose how to interpret the
contraction axiom, as discussed above, but also, we can choose how to interpret
typed quantifications, which ultimately boils down to the choice of how predicate
symbols are interpreted.
We will start by presenting (Section 2) this parametrised interpretation in the
setting of affine logic (AL). Then, via the two well-known Girard translations
from intuitionistic logic (IL) into AL [15], we will also obtain two parametrised
interpretations of IL (Section 3). We conclude (Section 4) by showing how all of
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the functional interpretations mentioned above can be obtained by suitable choices
of these parameters. In this process we have again discovered some new interpre-
tations (see Section 4).
1.1. Intuitionistic affine logic and theories
A sequent calculus for intuitionistic affine logic AL is shown in Table 1, with
negation A⊥ defined as A ⊸ ⊥. An extension of AL with new predicate and
function symbols, and non-logical axioms, will be called an intuitionistic affine
theory, or AL-theory, for short. Given an intuitionistic affine theory A we will
denote its set of predicate symbols by PredA, its set of formulas by FormA, and
its set of non-logical axioms by AxA. Subsection 1.3 defines the five AL-theories
that we will use in this paper.
Notation 1.1. If A is an AL-theory then we write Γ ⊢A A as an abbreviation for
“A proves the sequent Γ ⊢ A”. We write A ⇔A B when we have both A ⊢A B and
B ⊢A A. When the theoryA used is clear from the context, we omit the subscript.
We use boldface letters x, y, . . . for tuples of variables or terms, and write ε for
the empty tuple. Given a formula B(x) of an AL-theory, we will make use of the
following abbreviations ∀xBA :≡ ∀x(!B(x)⊸ A) and ∃xBA :≡ ∃x(B(x) ⊗ A).
1.2. Intuitionistic logic and theories
An intuitionistic theory, or IL-theory, is an extension of first-order intuition-
istic logic IL with constant symbols, predicate symbols, and non-logical axioms.
Given an intuitionistic theory I we will denote its set of predicate symbols by
PredI, its set of formulas by FormI, and its set of non-logical axioms by AxI.
Subsection 1.3 also defines the five IL-theories that we will use in this paper.
Notation 1.2. Given a formula B(x) of an IL-theory, we will make use of the
following abbreviations ∀xBA :≡ ∀x(B(x) → A) and ∃xBA :≡ ∃x(B(x) ∧ A).
Definition 1.3 (Girard translations, [15]). Define two translations3 of an IL-theory
3The (·)• translation of A ∧ B in linear logic is normally A•& B•, but, in the presence of
weakening, one can also define it with multiplicative conjunction A• ⊗ B•. We prefer this latter
version as it leads to simpler functional interpretations.
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into a corresponding AL-theory: (where P ranges over predicate symbols)
(P(t))• :≡ P(t) (P(t))◦ :≡ !P(t)
(A ∧ B)• :≡ A• ⊗ B• (A ∧ B)◦ :≡ A◦ ⊗ B◦
(A → B)• :≡ !A• ⊸ B• (A → B)◦ :≡ !(A◦ ⊸ B◦)
(∀xA)• :≡ ∀xA• (∀xA)◦ :≡ !∀xA◦
(∃xA)• :≡ ∃x!A• (∃xA)◦ :≡ ∃xA◦
Given an IL-theory I, let I• denote the AL-theory with the same constants and
predicate symbols as I, and non-logical axioms AxI• = {!Γ
• ⊢ A• : Γ ⊢ A ∈
AxI}. Similarly, let I
◦ denote the AL-theory with the same constants and predi-
cate symbols as I, and non-logical axioms AxI◦ = {Γ
◦ ⊢ A◦ : Γ ⊢ A ∈ AxI}.
Proposition 1.4. If Γ ⊢I A then !Γ
• ⊢I• A
• and Γ◦ ⊢I◦ A
◦.
Proof. A simple adaptation of the similar result from [15]. 
Proposition 1.5. For all A ∈ FormIL we have that A
◦ ⇔AL !A
•, and hence, for
any IL-theory I, the AL-theories I• and I◦ prove the same set of formulas.
Proof. The first part is shown in [14]. Using this it is easy to see that all the
non-logical axioms of I• are derivable in I◦, and vice-versa. 
Definition 1.6 (Forgetful translation). Define the following translation of an AL-
theory into a IL-theory: (where P ranges over predicate symbols)
(P(x))F :≡ P(x) (!A)F :≡ AF
(A ⊗ B)F :≡ AF ∧ BF (∀xA)F :≡ ∀xAF
(A ⊸ B)F :≡ AF → BF (∃xA)F :≡ ∃xAF
Given an AL-theory A, let AF denote the IL-theory with non-logical axioms
AxAF = {Γ
F ⊢ AF : Γ ⊢ A ∈ AxA} and the same constants and predicate symbols
asA.
1.3. Some concrete IL-theories and AL-theories
By the Girard translations (Definition 1.3) IL-theories give rise toAL-theories4,
and by the forgetful translation (Definition 1.6)AL-theories give rise to IL-theories.
4By Proposition 1.5, it does not matter which Girard translation we use.
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In this section we will define the following pairs of (IL,AL) theories:
IL-theory AL-theory theory of
ILeq ALeq equality
ILB ALB booleans (extends theory of equality)
ILω ALω finite types (extends theory of booleans)
WE-HAω WE-AHAω arithmetic in all finite types (decidable equality)
E-HAω∗ E-AHAω∗ arithmetic in all finite types (undecidable equality)
Let ILeq denote intuitionistic predicate logic with equality (see [19, Section
3.1]). Using Girard’s translations we can then obtain an AL-theory of equality
ALeq = (ILeq)•.
An IL-theory of booleans, which we will call ILB, can be obtained by extend-
ing ILeq with two constant symbols T and F, a new predicate symbol B(z), for “z
is a boolean”, and the following non-logical axioms:
⊢ B(T) ⊢ B(F) ⊢ ¬(T = F) A[T/z], A[F/z],B(z) ⊢ A
We will refer to the first two axioms as BR, and the last axiom as BL. We also
assume that in ILB we can define terms by cases, i.e. we have a function symbol
“if” such that the following are derivable in ILB
⊢ if(T, x, y) = x and ⊢ if(F, x, y) = y
Again, by Girard’s translations, we get an AL-theory of booleans ALB = (ILB)•.
Proposition 1.7. In ILB disjunction is definable as
A ∨ B :≡ ∃zB(((z = T) → A) ∧ ((z = F) → B))
while in ALB the additive connectives of linear logic are definable as
A& B :≡ ∀z(!B(z)⊸ ((!(z = T)⊸ A) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸ B)))
A ⊕ B :≡ ∃z(!B(z) ⊗ ((!(z = T)⊸ A) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸ B)))
in the sense that their corresponding rules are derivable.
Let A ⊕ B and A ∨ B be defined as in Proposition 1.7. Then the Girard trans-
lations of IL into AL extend to translations of ILB into ALB:
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Proposition 1.8. The following equivalences are provable in ALB
(i) (A ∨ B)• ⇔ !A• ⊕ !B•
(ii) (A ∨ B)◦ ⇔ A◦ ⊕ B◦
Proof. (i) We have
(A ∨ B)•
P1.7
≡ (∃zB(((z = T) → A) ∧ ((z = F) → B)))•
D1.3
⇔ ∃z!(B(z) ⊗ ((!(z = T)⊸ A•) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸ B•)))
⇔ ∃z(!B(z) ⊗ ((!(z = T)⊸!A•) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸!B•)))
P1.7
⇔ !A• ⊕ !B•
using that in affine logic !(A ⊗ B) is equivalent to !A⊗!B; and that !(!A ⊸ B) is
equivalent to !A⊸!B.
(ii) We have (A ∨ B)◦ ⇔!(A ∨ B)•
Part (i)
⇔ !(!A• ⊕ !B•) ⇔!A• ⊕ !B• ⇔ A◦ ⊕ B◦ using
the fact that (A∨ B)◦, A◦ and B◦ are equivalent to formulas !(A∨ B)•, !A• and !B•,
by Proposition 1.5. 
Definition 1.9 (Finite types). The finite types T are defined inductively as: B,N ∈
T (base types), and if ρ, τ ∈ T then ρ→ τ ∈ T (function types).
Let WE-HAω be the weakly extensional version of Heyting arithmetic in all
finite types (see [29] and [19, Section 3.3]). We will consider here a presentation
ofWE-HAω where terms are explicitly typed, so that it can be considered an IL-
theory as described above. For that matter, we assume that WE-HAω contains
explicit typing predicate symbols and axioms, i.e.
• for each finite type σ ∈ T we have predicate symbols σ(x)
• we have axioms ⊢ σ(t) for each constant cσ, i.e.
1. ⊢ N(0)
2. ⊢ (N→ N)(Suc)
3. ⊢ (σ → τ→ σ)(Kσ,τ), for each σ, τ ∈ T
4. ⊢ (σ → (σ→ τ) → (σ→ τ → ρ) → ρ)(Sσ,τ,ρ), for each σ, τ, ρ ∈ T
5. ⊢ (N→ σ→ (N→ σ → σ) → σ)(Recσ), for each σ ∈ T
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• A family of function symbols Apσ,τ( f , x) with axioms
5
(σ → τ)( f ), σ(x) ⊢ τ(Apσ,τ( f , x))
With the above axioms we can indeed show that for each term (t[xσ])τ with in-
trinsic type τ and free-variables xσ, we can derive σ(x) ⊢ τ(t[x]) in the system
above. Each formula A (with intrinsic types) must also be mapped to a formula
A⋆ (with explicit types) inductively – e.g. taking (∀xσA)⋆ := ∀x(σ(x) → A⋆).
Then, each original axiom Γ(xσ) ⊢ A(xσ) can be stated with explicit types as
σ(x), (Γ(xσ))⋆ ⊢ (A(xσ))⋆. It will be important for the verification of the sound-
ness (for the Dialectica interpretation), that in WE-HAω quantifier-free formulas
are decidable (see [19, Proposition 3.17]). For this decidability result to hold in
our setting with explicit typing, we also need to assume that (in the verifying sys-
tem) for each predicate symbol τ(x), where τ ∈ T , we have in WE-HAω a term
tτ(x) such that τ(x) ⊢ B(tτ(x)), and tτ(x) = T is provably equivalent to τ(x).
We then define the AL-theoryWE-AHAω = (WE-HAω)•. Note that although
the type B (and its corresponding axioms) are not usually included explicitly in
the definition ofWE-HAω, these are indeed definable by taking T := 0 and F := 1
and B(x) := (x = 0) ∨ (x = 1).
If we omit the arithmetical constants (zero, successor and recursors), and their
corresponding axioms fromWE-HAω, we obtain a purely intuitionistic theory of
finite types, which we call ILω. In this case the booleans are no longer definable,
and hence we assume that ILω is also an extension of ILB. Its corresponding
AL-theory will be denoted ALω = (ILω)•.
Finally, let us denote byT ∗ the extension of the set of finite types with an extra
closure condition: if ρ ∈ T ∗ then ρ∗ ∈ T ∗ (finite sequence types), and let E-HAω∗
be the system described in [3, Section 2.1], also presented with explicit types, as
described above.
Remark 1.10 (Majorizability). In E-HAω∗ we can extend Bezem’s majorizability
relation to include the finite sequence types:
x ≤∗τ y :≡ x ≤τ y, for τ ∈ {N,B}
f ≤∗τ→ρ g :≡ ∀y
τ, xτ ≤∗τ y( f x ≤
∗
ρ gy ∧ gx ≤
∗
ρ gy)
a ≤∗τ∗ b :≡ |a| ≤ |b| ∧ ∀i < |a|(ai ≤
∗
τ bi) ∧ ∀i < |b|(bi ≤
∗
τ bi)
5As usual we will normally write the term Apσ,τ(s)(t) as simply st.
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The main property we need is that for each closed term s (of type τ) there exists
a closed term t (of the same type τ) such that s ≤∗τ t provably in E-HA
ω∗. This is
indeed the case by observing that
L˜sσ
∗
f τ→σ→τzτ =τ Ls(λv
τλaσ.maxτ(v, f va))z
majorizes the list recursor L (see [3, Section 2.1]), where maxτ(·, ·) is defined
pointwise for function types, and for finite sequence types we take
maxτ∗(s, t) = 〈maxτ(si, ti)〉i<max(|s|,|t|)
taking si = 0 when i ≥ |s|.
Again, by the Girard translations, from the IL-theory E-HAω∗ we can obtain
an AL-theory E-AHAω∗ = (E-HAω∗)•.
2. Parametrised Interpretation of AL
We present now a parametrised interpretation of a “source” AL-theoryAs into
a “target” AL-theoryAt. In order to ensure that the parametrised interpretation is
sound, we will need to stipulate a few assumption aboutAs andAt:
(A1) The target theory At is an extension of AL
ω – defined in Section 1.3 – so
that we can work with typed λ-terms as witnesses.
(A2) In the source theoryAs, the predicate symbols are divided into two groups:
the computational symbols, denoted by PredcAs , and the non-computational
symbols, denoted by PredncAs . The predicate symbols ofAs are also assumed
to be predicate symbols ofAt.
(A3) For each computational predicate symbol P(x) ∈ PredcAs of As, of arity n,
we have associated in At a (n + 1)-ary formula x ≺
P a, and a finite type
wt(P) in which the witnesses a of P(x) will live in. We will call wt(P) the
witnessing type of P. We write ∀x≺P a A and ∃x≺Pa A as abbreviations for
∀x(x≺P a⊸ A) and ∃x(x≺P a ⊗ A), respectively. We assume that, overAt,
x≺Pa is stronger than P(x), i.e.
x≺P a ⊢At P(x).
(A4) For each finite type τ we associate in At a formula Wτ(x), which we will
use to restrict the domain of the witnesses and counter-witnesses. We also
assume that x≺P a implies that a is in W, i.e.
x≺P a ⊢At Wwt(P)(a).
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When τ is a tuple of finite types τ1, . . . , τn, we write Wτ(x1, . . . , xn) as an
abbreviation for Wτ1(x1), . . . ,Wτn(xn), when this appears in the context of a
sequent, or for Wτ1(x1)⊗ . . .⊗Wτn(xn), when this appears in the conclusion
of a sequent. We assume that, provably in At, the combinators Sρ,τ,σ and
Kρ,τ are in W, and that the application of a function in W to an argument in
W will also be in W, i.e.
(WK) ⊢At Wρ→τ→ρ(Kρ,τ)
(WS) ⊢At W(ρ→τ→σ)→(ρ→τ)→ρ→σ(Sρ,τ,σ)
(WAp) Wτ(x),Wτ→ρ( f ) ⊢At Wρ( f x)
(A5) For each formula A ofAt, tuple of variables x = x1, . . . , xn, and finite types
τ = τ1, . . . , τn we associate a tuple of bounding types bt(τ) and a formula
∀x ⊏τ a A, in which the variables x are no longer free. We do not assume
that the tuple of finite types bt(τ) has the same length as τ. The intuition
is that x ranges over elements of type τ, whereas the bounds a range over
possibly different types bt(τ). We use this parameter to interpret !A. This
parameter is assumed to satisfy:
(Q1) If A ⊢At B then ∀x⊏τ aA ⊢At ∀x⊏τ a B
(Q2) ⊢At ∀x⊏τ a !Wτ(x)
and, for each formula A of At, tuple of variables x, and types τ and ρ we
assume that there exist terms η(·), (·) ⊔ (·) and (·) ◦ (·) ofAt such that
(Cη) !Wτ(z), !∀x⊏τη(z) A ⊢At A[z/x]
⊢At Wτ→bt(τ)(η)
(C⊔) !Wτ,τ(x1, x2), !∀x⊏τ (x1 ⊔ x2) A ⊢At ∀x⊏τ x1 A ⊗ ∀x⊏τ x2 A
⊢At Wbt(τ)→bt(τ)→bt(τ)(λx1, x2.x1 ⊔ x2)
(C◦) !Wρ→bt(τ)( f ), !Wbt(ρ)(z), !∀x⊏τ ( f ◦ z) A ⊢At ∀y⊏ρ z !∀x⊏τ f yA
⊢At W(ρ→bt(τ))→bt(ρ)→bt(τ)(λ f , z. f ◦ z)
A term t[x], with free variables x, is called typable in At if ρ(x) ⊢At τ(t[x])
for some ρ and τ. We say that a typable term t[x] is in W if Wρ(x) ⊢At Wτ(t[x]).
Lemma 2.1. Let t be a term of At built from variables x = x1, . . . , xn and the
combinators K and S via application. Then W(x1, . . . , xn) ⊢At W(t).
Proof. Induction on the structure of t using assumptions (WS), (WK), (WAp). 
In each instantiation we will consider different choices for the parameters
{x ≺P a}P∈Predc
As
, {wt(P)}P∈Predc
As
, {Wτ(x)}τ∈T , and {∀x ⊏τ aA}A∈FormAt ,τ∈T for each
choice of variables x.
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Definition 2.2 (Adequate parameters in AL). Given theoriesAs andAt, a choice
of parameters will be called adequate for (As,At) if assumptions (A1) – (A5)
hold. Given a class of formulas C ⊆ FormAt , we say that the choice of parameters
in At is C-adequate for (As,At) if it is adequate for (As,At) when assumption
(A5) is only required to hold for formulas in C.
2.1. Parametrised interpretation of AL theories
Assume now a given choice of AL-theoriesAs (source theory) andAt (target
theory) satisfying the assumptions stated above. Recall that we write ε for the
empty tuple of terms. Let us use the same notation, and write ε for an empty tuple
of types as well.
Definition 2.3. We generalise the notion of witnessing type to all formulas by
defining for each formula A tuples of types τ+A and τ
−
A inductively as
τ+
P
:≡ wt(P), for P ∈ PredcAs
τ+
P
:≡ ε, for P ∈ PredncAs
τ+
A⊸B
:≡ τ+
A
→ τ+
B
, τ+
A
→ τ−
B
→ τ−
A
τ+
A⊗B
:≡ τ+
A
, τ+
B
τ+
∃zA
:≡ τ+
A
τ+
∀zA
:≡ τ+
A
τ+
!A
:≡ τ+
A
τ−
P
:≡ ε, for P ∈ PredcAs
τ−
P
:≡ ε, for P ∈ PredncAs
τ−
A⊸B
:≡ τ+
A
, τ−
B
τ−
A⊗B
:≡ τ−
A
, τ−
B
τ−
∃zA
:≡ τ−
A
τ−
∀zA
:≡ τ−
A
τ−
!A
:≡ bt(τ)−
A
Given a tuple of formulas Γ = A1, . . . , An we write τ
+
Γ
(resp., τ−
Γ
) for the tuple
τ+
A1
, . . . , τ+
An
(resp. τ−
A1
, . . . , τ−
An
).
We can now present the parametrised interpretation ofAs intoAt:
Definition 2.4 (Parametrised AL-interpretation). For each formula A of As, let
us associate a formula |A|xy of At, with two fresh lists of free-variables x and y,
inductively as follows: for computational predicate symbols P ∈ PredcAs we let
|P(x)|aε :≡ x≺
P a,
whereas for non-computational predicate symbols P ∈ PredncAs we let
|P(x)|εε :≡ P(x).
Assuming A and B have interpretations |A|xy and |B|
v
w, then we define
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|A⊸ B|
f ,g
x,w :≡ |A|
x
gxw ⊸ |B|
f x
w |∃zA|
x
y :≡ ∃z|A|
x
y
|A ⊗ B|x,vy,w :≡ |A|
x
y ⊗ |B|
v
w |∀zA|
x
y :≡ ∀z|A|
x
y
|!A|xa :≡ !∀y⊏τ−A a |A|
x
y
Given a tuple of formulas Γ = A1, . . . , An, we write |Γ|
x1,...,xn
y1,...,yn
is an abbreviation for
|A1|
x1
y1
, . . . , |An|
xn
yn
, assuming Ai has interpretation |A|
xi
yi
.
If A has interpretation |A|xy we call x the witnesses of A, and y the counter-
witnesses. We say that a formula A has no computational content if its interpre-
tation is |A|εε, i.e. if the tuples of witnesses and counter-witnesses are both empty.
Note that all of the computational content of a formula comes from the interpreta-
tion of the computational predicate symbols. The logical connectives (⊸ and ⊗),
the quantifiers (∀ and ∃) and the exponential (!) simply translate witnesses and
counter-witness for the subformulas into witnesses and counter-witnesses for the
compound formula. If the subformulas have no computational content then the
compound formula will not have any computational content either.
2.2. Soundness
Given a tuple of types ρ = ρ1, . . . , ρn and a type σ, let us write ρ → σ as an
abbreviation for the type ρ1 → . . .→ ρn → σ. Given tuples of terms t = t1, . . . , tn
and s we write t s for the tuple t1s, . . . , tns.
Definition 2.5 (Witnessable AL sequents). A sequent Γ ⊢ A of As is said to be
witnessable inAt if there are tuples of closed terms γ, a ofAt such that
(i) ⊢At Wτ+Γ→τ
−
A
→τ−
Γ
(γ) and ⊢At Wτ+Γ→τ
+
A
(a)
(ii) !Wτ+
Γ
,τ−
A
(x,w), |Γ|xγxw ⊢At |A|
ax
w
Definition 2.6 (Sound AL-interpretation). An AL-interpretation of As intoAt is
said to be sound if the provable sequents ofAs are witnessable inAt.
Theorem 2.7 (Soundness of AL-interpretation). Assume a fixed choice of the pa-
rameters inAt. If
(i) this choice is adequate for the formulas |A|xy , for all A inAs, and
(ii) the non-logical axioms ofAs are witnessable inAt,
then this instance of the parametrisedAL-interpretation of Definition 2.4 is sound.
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of [12, Thm. 2.2]. Under the assumptions of
the theorem, we must show that the provable sequents Γ ⊢ A ofAs are witnessable
in At. We do this by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢As A. The axioms of As
are witnessable by assumption. Let us consider each of the logical rules and show
that they turn witnessable premisses into witnessable conclusions. In each case we
need to prove points (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.5. Point (i), however, will follow
directly from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.1, since the terms witnessing
the conclusion of each rule will be build from the terms witnessing the premise via
simple λ-term constructions (definable from S and K). Therefore, we will focus
our attention on proving point (ii).
Cut. By induction hypothesis we have closed terms a0, a1,γ, δ, b such that
(IH(i)) ⊢ W(a0) and ⊢ W(γ) and ⊢ W(b) and ⊢ W(δ) and ⊢ W(a1)
(IH(ii)) !W(u, y), |Γ|
u
γuy ⊢ |A|
a0u
y and !W(v, x,w), |∆|
v
δvxw
, |A|xa1vxw ⊢ |B|
bvx
w
We claim that the terms γ˜ :≡ λu, v,w.γu(a1v(a0u)w) and δ˜ :≡ λu, v,w.δv(a0u)w
and b˜ :≡ λu, v.bv(a0u) witness the cut rule. Let a˜ = a1v(a0u)w. Using the
induction hypothesis (IH(i)) and (IH(ii)) we have
(IH(i))
!W(u, v,w) ⊢!W(a˜)
(IH(ii))
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A|
a0u
y
[ a˜
y
]
!W(u, a˜), |Γ|uγ˜uvw ⊢ |A|
a0u
a˜
(cut)
!W(u, v,w), |Γ|uγ˜uvw ⊢ |A|
a0u
a˜
and
(IH(i))
W(u) ⊢ W(a0u)
(IH(ii))
!W(v, x,w), |∆|vδvxw, |A|
x
a1vxw
⊢ |B|bvxw
[ a0u
x
]
!W(v, a0u,w), |∆|
v
δ˜uvw
, |A|
a0u
a˜ ⊢ |B|
b˜uv
w
(cut)
!W(u, v,w), |∆|v
δ˜uvw
, |A|
a0u
a˜ ⊢ |B|
b˜uv
w
so that with another cut we get !W(u, v,w), |Γ|uγ˜uvw, |∆|
v
δ˜uvw
⊢ |B|b˜uvw .
(⊗R). By induction hypothesis we have closed terms a, b,γ, δ in W such that
(IH) !W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A|
au
y and !W(v,w), |∆|
v
δvw
⊢ |B|bvw
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We claim that the terms λu, y, v,w.γuy and λu, y, v,w.δvw and λu, v.au and λu, v.bv
witness the conclusion of this rule. We have
(IH)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A|
au
y
(IH)
!W(v,w), |∆|vδvw ⊢ |B|
bv
w
(⊗R)
!W(u, y, v,w), |Γ|uγuy, |∆|
v
δvw ⊢ |A|
au
y ⊗ |B|
bv
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, y, v,w), |Γ|uγuy, |∆|
v
δvw ⊢ |A ⊗ B|
au,bv
y,w
(⊗L). By induction hypothesis we have closed terms γ, a, b, c in W such that
(IH) !W(u, x, v,w), |Γ|uγuxvw, |A|
x
auxvw, |B|
v
buxvw
⊢ |C|cuxvw
We claim that the terms γ, a, b and c witness the conclusion of the rule. We have
(IH)
!W(u, x, v,w), |Γ|uγuxvw, |A|
x
auxvw, |B|
v
buxvw ⊢ |C|
cuxv
w
(⊗L)
!W(u, x, v,w), |Γ|uγuxvw, |A|
x
auxvw ⊗ |B|
v
buxvw ⊢ |C|
cuxv
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x, v,w), |Γ|uγuxvw, |A ⊗ B|
x,v
auxvw,buxvw
⊢ |C|cuxvw
(⊸R). By induction hypothesis we have closed terms γ, a, b in W such that
(IH) !W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |A|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
We claim that the terms γ and a and b witness the conclusion of this rule. We
have
(IH)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |A|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(⊸R)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw ⊢ |A|
x
auxw ⊸ |B|
bux
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw ⊢ |A⊸ B|
au,bu
x,w
(⊸L). By induction hypothesis we have closed terms a, b, c,γ, δ such that
(IH(i)) ⊢ W(a) and ⊢ W(b) and ⊢ W(c) and ⊢ W(γ) and ⊢ W(δ)
(IH(ii)) !W(u, y), |Γ|
u
γuy ⊢ |A|
au
y and !W(w, v, z), |∆|
w
δwvz
, |B|v
bwvz
⊢ |C|cwvz
Using (IH(i)) and (IH(ii)) we have
(IH(ii))
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A|
au
y
[
g(au)(bw( f (au))z)
y
]
!W(u, g(au)(bw( f (au))z)), |Γ|uγu(g(au)(bw( f (au))z)) ⊢ |A|
au
g(au)(bw( f (au))z)
(IH(i))
!W(u,w, g, f , z), |Γ|uγu(g(au)(bw( f (au))z)) ⊢ |A|
au
g(au)(bw( f (au))z)
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and
(IH(ii))
!W(w, v, z), |∆|wδwvz, |B|
v
bwvz ⊢ |C|
cwv
z
[
f (au)
v
]
!W(w, f (au), z), |∆|wδw( f (au))z, |B|
f(au)
bw( f (au))z
⊢ |C|
cw( f (au))
z
(IH(i))
!W(w, f , u, z), |∆|wδw( f (au))z, |B|
f(au)
bw( f (au))z
⊢ |C|
cw( f (au))
z
Let us call the two derivations above π1 and π2, and let δ˜ = δw( f (au))z and
γ˜ = γu(g(au)(bw( f (au))z)). Then:
π1 π2
(⊸ L)
!W(u,w, g, f , z), |Γ|uγ˜, |∆|
w
δ˜
, |A|aug(au)(bw( f (au))z) ⊸ |B|
f(au)
bw( f (au))z
⊢ |C|
cw( f (au))
z
(D2.4)
!W(u,w, g, f , z), |Γ|uγ˜, |∆|
w
δ˜
, |A⊸ B|
f ,g
au,bw( f (au))z
⊢ |C|
cw( f (au))
z
Quantifiers. As the quantifiers are treated uniformly, the witnessing terms of the
premises of the rules are also witnessing terms for the conclusions: universal (∀)
(IH)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |A(t)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(∀L)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw,∀z|A(z)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |∀zA(z)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(IH)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A(z)|
au
y
(∀R)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ ∀z|A(z)|
au
y
(D2.4)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |∀zA(z)|
au
y
and existential (∃)
(IH)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |A(z)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(∃L)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw,∃z|A(z)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |∃zA(z)|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(IH)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |A(t)|
au
y
(∃R)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ ∃z|A(z)|
au
y
(D2.4)
!W(u, y), |Γ|uγuy ⊢ |∃zA(z)|
au
y
Weakening. By induction hypothesis the premise of the weakening rule is wit-
nessable, i.e. we have closed terms γ, b in W such that
(IH) !W(u,w), |Γ|uγuw ⊢ |B|
bu
w
Let 0 be an arbitrary closed terms of the appropriate type. We claim that the terms
λu, x,w.γuw and 0 and λu, x.bu witness the conclusion of the weakening rule:
(IH)
!W(u,w), |Γ|uγuw ⊢ |B|
bu
w
(wkn)
!W(u,w, x), |Γ|uγuw, !∀y⊏τ−A 0uxw |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
bu
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|u(λu,x,w.γuw)uxw, |!A|
x
0uxw ⊢ |B|
(λu,x.bu)ux
w
Contraction. By induction hypothesis we have closed terms γ, a0, a1, b such that
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(IH(i)) ⊢ W(γ) and ⊢ W(ai), for i ∈ {0, 1}, and ⊢ W(b)
(IH(ii)) !W(u, x0, x1,w), |Γ|
u
γux0x1w
, |!A|x0a0ux0x1w, |!A|
x1
a1ux0x1w ⊢ |B|
bux0x1
w
We claim that the terms λu, x,w.γuxxw and λu, x,w.a0uxxw⊔a1uxxw and λu, x.buxx
witness the conclusion of the contraction rule:
(IH(ii))
!W(u, x0, x1,w), |Γ|
u
γux0x1w
, |!A|x0a0ux0x1w, |!A|
x1
a1ux0x1w
⊢ |B|bux0x1w
[ x
x0
, x
x1
]
!W(u, x, x,w), |Γ|uγuxxw, |!A|
x
a0uxxw
, |!A|xa1uxxw ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(con)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxxw, |!A|
x
a0uxxw
, |!A|xa1uxxw ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxxw, !∀y⊏τ−A a0uxxw |A|
x
y , !∀y⊏τ−A a1uxxw |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(⊗L)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxxw, !∀y⊏τ−A a0uxxw |A|
x
y⊗!∀y⊏τ−A a1uxxw |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(C⊔)
!W(u, x,w, a0uxxw, a1uxxw), |Γ|
u
γuxxw, !∀y⊏τ−A a0uxxw ⊔ a1uxxw |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(IH(i))
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxxw, !∀y⊏τ−A a0uxxw ⊔ a1uxxw |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
buxx
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|u(λu,x,w.γuxxw)uxw, |!A|
x
(λu,x,w.a0uxxw⊔a1uxxw)uxw
⊢ |B|(λu,x.buxx)uxw
(!L). By induction hypothesis the premise of the dereliction rule is witnessable,
i.e. we have closed terms γ, a, b such that
(IH(i)) ⊢ W(γ) and ⊢ W(a) and ⊢ W(b)
(IH(ii)) !W(u, x,w), |Γ|
u
γuxw, |A|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
We claim that the terms γ and λu, x,w.η(auxw) and b witness the conclusion of
the contraction rule:
(IH(ii))
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |A|
x
auxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(Cη)
!W(u, x,w, auxw), |Γ|uγuxw, !∀y⊏τ−A η(auxw) |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(IH(i))
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, !∀y⊏τ−A η(auxw) |A|
x
y ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(D2.4)
!W(u, x,w), |Γ|uγuxw, |!A|
x
(λu,x,w.η(auxw))uxw ⊢ |B|
bux
w
(!R). By induction hypothesis the premise of the promotion rule is witnessable,
i.e. we have closed terms γ, a such that
(IH(i)) ⊢ W(γ) and ⊢ W(a)
(IH(ii)) !W(u, y
′), |!Γ|u
γuy′ ⊢ |A|
au
y′
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We claim that the terms λu, y.(γu) ◦ y and a witness the conclusion of the pro-
motion rule. If Γ = B1, . . . , Bn, we write ∀w ⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw as an abbreviation for
the tuple ∀w1 ⊏τ−
B1
γ1uy
′ |B1|
u1
w1 , . . . ,∀wn ⊏τ−Bn
γnuy
′ |Bn|
un
wn , assuming each Bi has
interpretation |Bi|
ui
wi , :
(IH(ii))
!W(u, y′), |!Γ|uγuy′ ⊢ |A|
au
y′
(D2.4)
!W(u, y′), !∀w⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw ⊢ |A|
au
y′
(Q1)
!W(u),∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !W(y′),∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw′ ⊢ ∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(!L)
!W(u), !∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !W(y′), !∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw′ ⊢ ∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(!R)
!W(u), !∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !W(y′), !∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw′ ⊢ !∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(Q2)
!W(u), !∀y′⊏τ−
A
y !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
γuy′ |Γ|uw′ ⊢ !∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(C◦)
!W(u, y,γu), !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
(γu) ◦ y |Γ|uw′ ⊢ !∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(IH(i))
!W(u, y), !∀w′⊏τ−
Γ
(γu) ◦ y |Γ|uw′ ⊢ !∀y
′
⊏τ−
A
y |A|auy′
(D2.4)
!W(u, y), |!Γ|u(γu)◦y ⊢ |!A|
au
y
That concludes the proof. 
2.3. Parametrised interpretation of ALB (interpreting disjunction)
The parametrised interpretation of AL-theories presented above deals uni-
formly with the multiplicative connectives (A ⊗ B and A ⊸ B), the modality (!A)
and the quantifiers (∃zA and ∀zA), but it leaves anything else to the non-logical
axioms of the theory. In particular, the reader will notice that we have not commit-
ted to any particular interpretation of the additive connectives (A ⊕ B and A&B).
As described in Subsection 1.3, we aim to capture these via the theory of booleans
ALB, where these additive connectives are definable.
Hence, in this section we show how, with some extra assumptions on the inter-
pretation of the predicate symbol B(x), the parametrised interpretation of AL can
be extended to a parametrised interpretation of ALB, and hence, a parametrised
interpretation of disjunction.
Let As be an extension of AL
B which is obtained as the Girard translation
of an ILB-theory, and At be an extension of AL
ω such that assumptions (A1) –
(A5) hold. In this paper we will always assume that the equality predicate is non-
computational, so that |s = t|εε :≡ s = t. We then consider the following extra
assumption on the interpretation z≺B b of the boolean predicate B:
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(A6) Assume that for each predicate symbol P ofAs we have a term inAt
mBP : wt(B) → wt(P) → wt(P) → wt(P)
such that
(i) ⊢At Wwt(P)→wt(P)→wt(B)→wt(P)(m
B
P
), and
(ii) !W(x1, x2), !(z≺
B b), !(x≺P if(z, x1, x2)) ⊢At x≺
PmB
P
(b, x1, x2).
We also assume that for some terms T˜ and F˜ ofAt we have ⊢At T≺
B T˜ and
⊢At F≺
B F˜.
Our assumption that As is the Girard translation of an IL
B-theory is crucial
for the following definition and lemma, where we only quantify over intuitionistic
formulas:
Definition 2.8. For each intuitionistic formula A, define the tuple of terms
mBA : wt(B) → τ
+
A• → τ
+
A• → τ
+
A•
by induction on A, as follows:
mB
A∧B
(b, x1, v1, x2, v2) = m
B
A
(b, x1, x2),m
B
B
(b, v1, v2)
mB
A→B
(b, f 1, g1, f2, g2) = λx
τ+
A• .mB
B
(b, f 1x, f 2x), λx
τ+
A•λwτ
−
B• .g1xw ⊔ g2xw
mB
∃zA
(b, x1, x2) = m
B
A
(b, x1, x2)
mB
∀zA
(b, x1, x2) = m
B
A
(b, x1, x2)
where, for predicate symbols P, we let mB
P
be the term assumed to exist in (A6).
Lemma 2.9 (Monotonicity lemma for B). Under assumption (A6), for each intu-
itionistic formula A, we have:
(i) ⊢At Wτ+A•→τ
+
A•
→wt(B)→τ+
A•
(mBA)
(ii) !W(x1, x2, y), !(z≺
Bb), !|A•|
if(z,x1,x2)
y ⊢At |A
•|
mB
A
(b,x1,x2)
y
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula A. (i) follows directly from
assumptions (A6) (i) and (C⊔), and Lemma 2.1. (ii) The case where A is a pred-
icate symbol also follows directly from (A6) (ii). The cases of conjunction, ex-
istential and universal quantifiers are easy to verify. Let us focus on the case of
implication. AssumeW( f 1, g1, f 2, g2, x,w) and !(z≺
B b) (and hence B(z)). Noting
that
(∗) B(z),∀y⊏τ−
A
g1xw |A
•|xy ,∀y⊏τ−A g1xw |A
•|xy ⊢ ∀y⊏τ−A if(z, g1xw, g2xw) |A
•|xy
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we have
|(A → B)•|
if(z, f1,g1, f 2,g2)
x,w
≡ !∀y⊏τ−
A
if(z, g1xw, g2xw) |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
if(z, f1x, f2x)
w
(∗)
⇒ !∀y⊏τ−
A
g1xw |A
•|xy ⊗ !∀y⊏τ−A g2xw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
if(z, f 1x, f2x)
w
(C⊔)
⇒ !∀y⊏τ−
A
g1xw ⊔ g2xw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
if(z, f1x, f2x)
w
(IH)
⇒ !∀y⊏τ−
A
g1xw ⊔ g2xw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
mB
B
(b, f 1x, f2x)
w
≡ |(A → B)•|
mB
A→B
(b, f1 ,g1, f2,g2)
x,w
since the assumptions imply W( f 1x, f 2x,w) – needed for the (IH). 
Using the monotonicity lemma above (Lemma 2.9) we can then show that the
axioms A[T/z], A[F/z],B(z) ⊢ A of ALB are interpretable when A is the Girard
translation of an intuitionistic formula:
Theorem 2.10. Under assumption (A6), for any intuitionistic formula A the se-
quent !A•[T/z], !A•[F/z], !B(z) ⊢ A• is witnessable inAt.
Proof. Starting with the following consequence of BL
!W(x1, x2, y), !|A
•[T/z]|if(T,x1,x2)y , !|A
•[F/z]|if(F,x1,x2)y , !B(z) ⊢At |A
•|if(z,x1,x2)y
we can apply Lemma 2.9 (ii) to obtain
!W(x1, x2, y), !|A
•[T/z]|x1y , !|A
•[F/z]|x2y , !(z≺
B b) ⊢At |A
•|
mB
A•
(b,x1,x2)
y
and by (Cη), assuming !W(x1, x2, y), we have
!∀y′⊏τ−
A•
η(y) |A•[T/z]|x1y′ , !∀y
′
⊏τ−
A•
η(y) |A•[F/z]|x2y′ , !(z≺
B b) ⊢At |A
•|
mB
A•
(b,x1,x2)
y
The witnessing terms are clearly in W (referring to Lemma 2.9 (i)). 
That the axioms BR are witnessable follows from the second part of (A6),
and ⊢ ¬(T = F) is interpreted by itself, since we are assuming that the equality
predicate is non-computational. Therefore, assumptions (A1) – (A6) guarantee
the soundness of the interpretation ofAs intoAt.
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2.4. Parametrised interpretation ofWE-AHAω (interpreting induction)
As we have done for the theory of booleans B above, we can also prove a
general monotonicity lemma, and a corresponding parametric interpretation, for
the theory of natural numbers N and finite types T . Hence, here we take As =
WE-AHAω = (WE-HAω)• and At = N-AHA
ω = (N-HAω)•. On top of the
assumptions (A1) – (A6) we must add assumptions that ensure the soundness of
the induction axiom schema, and also the typing axioms:
(A7) Assume that for each predicate symbol P ofAs we have a term inAt
mNP : (N→ wt(P)) → wt(N) → wt(P)
such that
• ⊢At Wwt(P)→wt(P)→wt(N)→wt(P)(m
N
P
)
• !∀nNW( f n), !(n≺N a), !(x≺P f n) ⊢At x≺
PmN
P
( f )(a)
• for each a ∈ wt(N) there exists an Na ∈ N such that n≺
N a ⊢At n ≤ Na
(A8) Assume that inAt we have a family of terms A˜p such that
f ≺σ→τ f˜ , x≺σ x˜ ⊢At Ap( f , x)≺
τ A˜p( f˜ , x˜)
and that for each constant cτ ofAs we have a term c˜ ofAt such that
• ⊢At c≺
τ c˜
In particular, it follows that
• for each numeral n ∈ N there exists a term an such that ⊢At n≺
N an.
Let us see how these assumptions imply the soundness of the non-logical ax-
ioms ofWE-AHAω.
Definition 2.11. For each intuitionistic formula A, define the tuple of terms
mNA : (N→ τ
+
A•) → wt(N) → τ
+
A•
by induction on A, as follows:
mN
A∧B
( f A, f B)(a) = m
N
A
( f A)(a),m
N
B
( f B)(a)
mN
A→B
( f , g)(a) = λxτ
+
A• .mN
B
(λi. f ix)(a); λxτ
+
A• ,wτ
−
B• .g⊔Naxw
mN
∃xA
( f )(a) = mN
A
( f )(a)
mN
∀xA
( f )(a) = mN
A
( f )(a)
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where, for predicate symbols P we let mN
P
be the term assumed to exist in (A7),
and g⊔ is defined recursively as
g⊔nxw =



g0xw if n = 0
gnxw ⊔ g⊔(n − 1)xw if n > 0
Lemma 2.12 (Monotonicity lemma for N). Under assumption (A7), for each in-
tuitionistic formula A, we have:
(i) ⊢At W(N→τ+A• )→wt(N)→τ
+
A•
(mN
P
)
(ii) !∀nNW( fn), !W(y), !(n≺N a), |A•|
fn
y ⊢At |A
•|
mN
A
( f )(a)
y
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of the monotonicity lemma for B (Lemma
2.9). In the case of implication we first need to prove
(∗) !∀y⊏τ−
A
g⊔Naxw |A
•|xy , !(n≺
N a) ⊢At ∀y⊏τ−A gnxw |A
•|xy
which we can do by first proving, using induction on k and then taking k = Na,
!∀y⊏τ−
A
g⊔kxw |A•|xy , !(n ≤ k) ⊢At ∀y⊏τ−A gnxw |A
•|xy
The above also uses applications of (C⊔) for the induction step. Hence, assuming
!∀nNW( fn, gn) and !W(x,w) and !(n≺N a) we have
|(A → B)•|
fn,gn
x,w ≡ !∀y⊏τ−A gnxw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
fnx
w
(∗)
⇒ !∀y⊏τ−
A
g⊔Naxw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
(λn. fnx)(n)
w
(IH)
⇒ !∀y⊏τ−
A
g⊔Naxw |A
•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
mN
B
(λn. fnx)(a)
w
≡ |(A → B)•|
mN
A→B
( f ,g)(a)
x,w
since the assumptions imply !∀nNW( fnx) – needed for the (IH). 
Proposition 2.13. Under assumption (A7), the induction rule
⊢ A•(0) !A•(n), !N(n) ⊢ A•(n + 1)
!N(n) ⊢ A•(n)
is witnessable inAt.
Proof. Wemust show that if the two premises are witnessable then the conclusion
is also witnessable. Let s, r, t in W be realisers for the premises:
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(i) !W(y) ⊢At |A
•(0)|sy
(ii) !W(x, y), !∀y′⊏τ−
A•
raxy |A•(n)|xy′ , !(n≺
N a) ⊢At |A
•(n + 1)|taxy
From the assumption that for each n ∈ N there exists an an ∈ wt(N) such that
n≺N an, we have
(iii) !W(x, y), !∀y′⊏τ−
A•
ranxy |A
•(n)|xy′ , !N(n) ⊢At |A
•(n + 1)|
tanx
y
which implies
(iv) !W(x), !∀yW|A•(n)|xy , !N(n) ⊢At !∀y
W|A•(n + 1)|
tanx
y
Let fn be defined by primitive recursion on n as
fn =



s if n = 0
tan( f (n − 1)) if n > 0
Since W(s, t, an), it follows that !∀n
NW( fn). From (i) and (iv), by induction on n
we have
(v) !W(y), !N(n) ⊢At |A
•(n)|
fn
y
and, by Lemma 2.12, !W(y), !(n≺N a) ⊢At |A
•(n)|
mN
A
( f )(a)
y . 
Using (A8) we can also guarantee the soundness of the typing axioms of
WE-AHAω. The remaining non-logical axioms ofWE-AHAω only involve equa-
tions on natural numbers, and are easily seen to be witnessable. It follows that as-
sumptions (A1) – (A8) guarantee the soundness of the interpretation ofWE-AHAω
into N-AHAω.
3. Parametrised Interpretations of IL
We now describe how the parametrised interpretation ofAL-theories gives rise
to two parametrised interpretations of IL-theories.
Definition 3.1 (AL-parameters from IL-parameters). In the context of IL-theories,
when we refer to assumptions (A1) – (A8), we mean the forgetful translation of
originalAL-assumptions, by considering the following translation of IL-parameters:
W•τ(x) :≡ (Wτ(x))
•
x ≺P• a :≡ (x≺
P a)•
∀x
•
⊏ τ aA :≡ (∀x⊏τ aA
F )•
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Is It
I•s ≃ I
◦
s I
•
t ≃ I
◦
t
{{·}}xy ; ((·))
x
y
(·)•; (·)◦
| · |xy
(·)F
Figure 1: Parametrised interpretations of Is into It
For instance, (A1) would say that when interpreting an IL-theory Is into an
IL-theory It, the theory It must be an extension of IL
ω. What is important is
that from the assumptions that Is and It satisfy
6 the IL-version of (A1) – (A8)
for the parameters {x≺P a}P∈Predc
Is
, {Wτ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x⊏τ aA}τ∈T ;A∈FormIt , it must
follow that I•s and I
•
t satisfy the AL-version of (A1) – (A8) for the parameters
{x ≺P• a}P∈PredcI•s
, {W•τ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x
•
⊏ τ a A}τ∈T ;A∈FormIt .
We will normally omit the type parameter τ in the formulas above when this
can be easily inferred from the context. For an IL-theory, we write ∀x≺P a A and
∃x≺P a A as abbreviations for ∀x(x≺P a → A) and ∃x(x≺P a ∧ A), respectively.
Definition 3.2 (IL-interpretations). Given the choice of IL parameters in It, con-
sider the (·)•-translation of these parameters in the AL-theory I•t with the cor-
responding AL-interpretation A 7→ |A|xy of I
•
s into I
•
t . This gives rise to the
following IL-interpretation of Is into It
A 7→ (|A•|xy)
F
which we will abbreviate as {{A}}xy :≡ (|A
•|xy)
F . Similarly, consider the (·)◦-
translation of the parameters in I◦t with the corresponding AL-interpretation
A 7→ |A|xy of I
◦
s into I
◦
t . This gives rise to the following IL-interpretation of
Is into It
A 7→ (|A◦|xy)
F
6By Proposition 1.5 it follows that I◦s and I
◦
t also satisfy the AL-version of (A1) – (A8) for
the parameters
W◦τ(x) :≡ (Wτ(x))
◦
x ≺P◦ a :≡ (x≺
P a)◦
∀x
◦
⊏ τ a A :≡ (∀x⊏τ a A
F )◦
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which we will abbreviate as ((A))xy :≡ (|A
◦|xy)
F .
The relation between the parametrised interpretation of AL-theories, and the
two parametrised interpretations of IL-theories is summarised in Figure 1.
Proposition 3.3. The following equivalences are provable in It
{{P(x)}}a ⇔ x≺P a if P ∈ Predc
Is
{{P(x)}} ⇔ P(x) if P ∈ PredncIs
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀y⊏τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}b,x,vy,w ⇔ ∃z≺
B b((z = T → ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′) ∧ (z = F → ∀w
′
⊏τ−
B•
w {{B}}vw′))
{{∃zA}}xy ⇔ ∃z∀y
′
⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′
{{∀zA}}xy ⇔ ∀z{{A}}
x
y
In particular, we have that for computational predicate symbols P:
{{∃zPA}}c,xy ⇔ ∃z≺
P c∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′
{{∀zPA}}
f
b,y
⇔ ∀z≺P b {{A}}
fb
y
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 3.4. The following equivalences are provable in It
((P(x)))a ⇔ x≺P a if P ∈ PredcIs
((P(x))) ⇔ P(x) if P ∈ Prednc
Is
((A → B))
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀x
′,w′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w (((A))x
′
gx′w′ → ((B))
f x′
w′ )
((A ∧ B))x,vy,w ⇔ ((A))
x
y ∧ ((B))
v
w
((A ∨ B))x,v,by,w ⇔ ∃z≺
B b((z = T → ((A))xy) ∧ (z = F → ((B))
v
w))
((∃zA))xy ⇔ ∃z((A))
x
y
((∀zA))xy ⇔ ∀y
′
⊏τ−
A◦
y∀z((A))xy′
In particular, we have that for computational predicate symbols P
((∃zPA))x,cy ⇔ ∃z≺
P c ((A))xy
((∀zPA))
f
c,y ⇔ ∀c
′, y′⊏wt(P),bt(τ)−
A◦
c, y∀c′′, y′′⊏τ−
A◦
c′, y′ ∀z≺P c′′ ((A))
f c′′
y′′
Proof. See Appendix B. 
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3.1. Soundness of the {{·}}-interpretation
Let us now see how we can derive the soundness for the IL-interpretation {{·}}
from the soundness of the corresponding AL-interpretation | · |.
Definition 3.5 ({{·}}-witnessable IL-sequents). A sequent Γ ⊢ A of Is is said to be
{{·}}-witnessable in It if there are closed terms γ, a of It such that
(i) ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
−
A•
→wt(τ−
Γ•
)(γ) and ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
+
A•
(a), and
(ii) Wτ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w),∀y⊏τ−
Γ•
γxw {{Γ}}xy ⊢It {{A}}
ax
w .
Definition 3.6 (Sound IL-interpretation). An IL-interpretation of Is into It is
said to be sound if the provable sequents of Is are witnessable in It.
Lemma 3.7. ((|A•|xy)
F )• ≡ |A•|xy .
Proof. By a simple induction on the structure of A. 
Lemma 3.8. If Γ ⊢ A is {{·}}-witnessable in It, then !Γ
• ⊢ A• is witnessable in I•t .
Proof. By assumptionwe have closed terms γ, a ofIt such that ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
−
A•
→wt(τ−
Γ•
)(γ)
and ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
+
A•
(a) and
Wτ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w),∀y⊏τ−
Γ•
γxw (|Γ•|xy)
F ⊢It (|A
•|axw )
F .
By Proposition 1.4 we have
W•
τ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w), !∀y
•
⊏ τ−
Γ•
γxw |Γ•|xy ⊢I•t ((|A
•|axw )
F )•.
By Lemma 3.7 this implies
W•
τ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w), !∀y
•
⊏ τ−
Γ•
γxw |Γ•|xy ⊢I•t |A
•|axw
Hence !Γ• ⊢ A• is witnessable in I•t . 
Theorem 3.9 (Soundness of {{·}}-interpretation). Assume a fixed choice of IL-
parameters {x≺Pa}P∈Predc
Is
, {Wτ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x⊏τ a A}τ∈T ;A∈FormIt in It. If
(i) the corresponding AL-parameters, {x ≺P• a}P∈PredcI•s
, {W•τ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x
•
⊏
τ aA}τ∈T ;A∈FormI•
t
, are an adequate choice for the formulas |A|xy , for all A in
I•s , and
(ii) the non-logical axioms of Is are {{·}}-witnessable in It,
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then the {{·}}-interpretation of Is into It is sound.
Proof. The second assumption and Lemma 3.8 imply that all the non-logical ax-
ioms of I•s are witnessable in I
•
t . Therefore, given the AL-parameters {x ≺
P
•
a}P∈Predc
I•s
, {W•τ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x
•
⊏ τ a A}τ∈T ;A∈FormI•
t
, by the first assumption and the
Soundness Theorem (Theorem 2.7) we have that this instance of the parametrised
interpretation | · | is a sound interpretation of I•s into I
•
t . Now, assume Γ ⊢Is A. By
Proposition 1.4 we have !Γ• ⊢I•s A
•. By the soundness of A 7→ |A|xy we have closed
terms γ, a of I•t such that
1. ⊢I•
t
W•
τ+
Γ•
→τ−
A•
→wt(τ−
Γ•
)(γ) and ⊢I•t W
•
τ+
Γ•
→τ+
A•
(a)
2. !W•
τ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w), !∀y
•
⊏ τ−
Γ•
γxw |Γ•|xy ⊢I•t |A
•|axw .
Hence, by the forgetful translation (Definition 1.6), we have
1. ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
−
A•
→wt(τ−
Γ•
)(γ) and ⊢It Wτ+Γ•→τ
+
A•
(a)
2. Wτ+
Γ•
,τ−
A•
(x,w),∀y⊏τ−
Γ•
γxw {{Γ}}xy ⊢It {{A}}
ax
w .

3.2. Soundness of the ((·))-interpretation
In a similar manner we can derive the soundness for the ((·))-interpretation
from the soundness of the AL-interpretation | · |.
Definition 3.10 (((·))-witnessable IL-sequents). A sequent Γ ⊢ A of Is is said to
be ((·))-witnessable in It if there are closed terms γ, a of It such that
(i) ⊢It Wτ+Γ◦→τ
−
A◦
→τ−
Γ◦
(γ) and ⊢It Wτ+Γ◦→τ
+
A◦
(a), and
(ii) Wτ+
Γ◦
,τ−
A◦
(x,w), ((Γ))xγxw ⊢It ((A))
ax
w .
Lemma 3.11. ((|A◦|xy)
F )◦ ≡ |A◦|xy .
Proof. By a simple induction on the structure of A. 
Lemma 3.12. If Γ ⊢ A is ((·))-witnessable in It, then Γ
◦ ⊢I◦
t
A◦ is witnessable in
I◦t .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.8. 
Theorem 3.13 (Soundness of the ((·))-interpretation). Assume a fixed choice of
IL-parameters {x≺P a}P∈Predc
Is
, {Wτ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x⊏τ aA}τ∈T ;A∈FormIt in It. If
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(i) the corresponding AL-parameters, {x ≺P◦ a}P∈PredcI•s
, {W◦τ(x)}τ∈T and {∀x
◦
⊏
τ aA}τ∈T ;A∈FormI•
t
, are an adequate choice for the formulas |A|xy , for all A in
I◦s , and
(ii) all the non-logical axioms of Is are ((·))-witnessable in It,
then the ((·))-interpretation of Is into It is sound.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.9. 
3.3. Comparing the interpretations ((·)) and {{·}}
Given that !A• is equivalent to A◦ over AL (cf. Proposition 1.5), one should
expect that the interpretations ((·)) and {{·}} are also, in some sense, equivalent. In
order to prove such relation it seems that we need to place the following extra
assumptions on the parameter ∀y ⊏τ a A in order to ensure that it behaves as a
bounded universal quantifier:
(Q3) ∀x⊏τ a (A ⊗ B(x)) ⇔At A ⊗ ∀x⊏τ a B(x), if x < FV(A)
(Q4) ∀z∀x⊏τ aA ⇔At ∀x⊏τ a∀zA
(Q5) ∃z∀x⊏τ aA ⇒At ∀x⊏τ a∃zA
We then obtain a relationship between {{A}}xy and ((A))
x
y as follows:
Theorem 3.14. For each formula A there are tuples of closed terms s1, t1 and
s2, t2 such that
(i) Wτ+
A•
,τ−
A◦
(x, y),∀y′⊏τ−
A•
s1xy {{A}}
x
y′ ⊢ILω ((A))
t1x
y
(ii) Wτ+
A◦
,τ−
A•
(x, y), ((A))xs2xy ⊢ILω ∀y
′
⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}t2xy′
(iii) ⊢ILω W(s1) ∧W(s2) ∧W(t1) ∧W(t2), of appropriate types.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
It follows from Theorem 3.14 that the interpretations {{A}}xy and ((A))
x
y are in
fact two different presentations of the same interpretation, in the sense that these
two interpretations must necessarily have the same set of characterising principles,
and in particular will validate the same set of principles.
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4. Concrete Interpretations of WE-HAω
Let us conclude by considering several instances of the parametrised IL in-
terpretations {{·}} and ((·)) (Definition 3.2). By Theorems 3.9 and 3.13, in order to
prove the soundness of the derived IL interpretation of Is into It, it is enough to
check that the choice of parameters is adequate for the formulas in the image of
the interpretation, and that the non-logical axioms of Is are witnessable in It.
For simplicity, for all instantiations considered here we always take the source
theory to be Is = WE-HA
ω (equality only for type level 0, quantifier-free for-
mulas decidable) and the target theory to be It = N-HA
ω (equality available for
all types). This means that the predicate symbols we must consider are typing
assertions ρ(x), for each finite type ρ, and we will consider all of them as compu-
tational, i.e. in Predc
Is
. In this case I•s = WE-AHA
ω and I•t = N-AHA
ω. That
deals with assumptions (A1) and (A2).
We consider three groups of instantiations, depending on the choice of the
parameter x ≺τ a, which we will take to be either x =τ a (equality), x ∈τ a
(set inclusion) or x ≤∗τ a (majorizability). In each of these cases, and for the
corresponding instances of W that we will consider, it should be straightforward
to verify that assumptions (A6), (A7) and (A8) are satisfied (disjunction, induction
and finite types). For instance, in the case of majorizability, whenWτ(x) = x ≤
∗
τ x,
assumption (A7) becomes ∀nN( f n ≤∗τ f n), n ≤ a, x ≤
∗
τ f n ⊢ x ≤
∗
τ m
N
P
( f )(a)
which is satisfied for mN
P
( f )(a) = maxn≤a f n; and (A8) follows directly from the
definition of majorizability, taking A˜p = Ap. Note that self-majorizability x ≤∗τ∗ x
for the sequence type τ∗ boils down to every element of the sequence x being
self-majorizing, i.e. ∀i < |x|(xi ≤
∗
τ xi).
4.1. Interpretations where x≺τ a :≡ x =τ a
The instances where x ≺τ a is chosen to be τ(x) ∧ (x = a), with wt(τ) = τ
and mBτ ( f )(a) = m
N
τ ( f )(a) = f (a), which we call precise interpretations, include
the seminal interpretations such as Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation, its Diller-
Nahm variant, and Kreisel’s modified realizability. In these cases the soundness
of the interpretation is already known, so we will simply show in detail how the
parameters are instantiated to obtain these interpretations, without duelling too
much on their soundness.
Modified realizability interpretation. Consider the following instantiation of
the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ ε A bt(τ) m
B
τ m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x = a) τ true ∀xτ A ε ifτ λ f . f
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where ε denotes the empty tuple of terms or types. Since A◦ is equivalent to !A•,
we see that A◦ has interpretation ((A))xε , and we normally omit the empty tuple
symbol. Using Proposition 3.4, we then see that this instantiation leads to the
following interpretation:
Proposition 4.1 (Kreisel’s modified realizability of WE-HAω). With the param-
eters instantiated as above we have:
((A → B)) f ⇔ ∀x(((A))x → ((B)) f x)
((A ∧ B))x,v ⇔ ((A))x ∧ ((B))v
((A ∨ B))x,v,b ⇔ B(b) ∧ (b = T → ((A))x) ∧ (b = F → ((B))v)
((∃zτA))x,c ⇔ τ(c) ∧ ((A[c/z]))x
((∀zτA)) f ⇔ ∀zτ((A)) f z
so that ((A))x can be seen to correspond to x mr A.
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.4. 
Dialectica interpretation. Consider this instantiation of the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x = a) τ true A[a/x] τ ifτ λ f . f
Proposition 4.2 (Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation ofWE-HAω). With the param-
eters instantiated as above we have:
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
gxw → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}b,x,vy,w ⇔ B(b) ∧ (b = T → {{A}}
x
y) ∧ (b = F → {{B}}
v
w)
{{∃zτA}}c,xy ⇔ τ(c) ∧ {{A[c/z]}}
x
y
{{∀zτA}}
f
y,b
⇔ τ(b) → {{A[b/z]}}
fb
y
so that {{A}}xy can be seen to correspond to AD(x; y).
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.3, using the above instantiation of the parame-
ters. We are using here the equivalences
∃xτ(x = t ∧ A(x)) ⇔ τ(t) ∧ A(t) and ∀xτ(x = t → A(x)) ⇔ τ(t) → A(t)
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which are valid in N-HAω, in order to remove equality on higher-types. In this
way, since our source theory is WE-HAω, we also have that for all formulas A
of WE-HAω, the formula {{A}}xy will be decidable. This property is essential for
satisfying condition (C⊔), where y1 ⊔ y2 is defined via a case distinction involving
the formula {{A}}xy . This is also the only place where wemake use of the assumption
that the choice of parameters only needs to be adequate for the formulas in the
image of the interpretation. 
Diller-Nahm interpretation. Consider this instantiation of the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x = a) τ true ∀x ∈τ aA τ
∗ ifτ λ f . f
Proposition 4.3. With the parameters instantiated as above we have:
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀y ∈τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}
b,x,v
y,w ⇔ B(b) ∧ (b = T → ∀y
′ ∈τ−
A•
y{{A}}xy′) ∧ (b = F → ∀w
′ ∈τ−
B•
w{{B}}vw′)
{{∃zτA}}c,xy ⇔ τ(c) ∧ ∀y
′ ∈τ−
A•
y {{A[c/z]}}xy′
{{∀zτA}}
f
c,y ⇔ τ(c) → {{A[c/z]}}
fc
y
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.3, using the above instantiation of the parame-
ters. 
The treatment of disjunction and existential quantifier in the instance above
appears to diverge from the standard Diller-Nahm interpretation, but the following
proposition shows that this is in fact an equivalent way of presenting the Diller-
Nahm interpretation.
Proposition 4.4 (Correspondence with Diller-Nahm interpretation ofWE-HAω).
The interpretation above {{A}}xy can be seen to correspond to ADN(x; y), in the sense
that for each A there are terms s1, t1 and s2, t2 such that
(i) ∀y′ ∈ s1xy{{A}}
x
y′ ⊢ ADN(t1x; y)
(ii) ∀y′ ∈ s2xy ADN(x; y
′) ⊢ {{A}}t2xy
Proof. By induction on A.
Existential quantifier (i). Let s1, t1 be given by induction hypothesis. Then:
30
∀y′ ∈ {s1xy}{{∃z
τA}}
c,x
y′
P 4.3
⇔ ∀y′ ∈ {s1xy}(τ(c) ∧ ∀y
′′ ∈ y′ {{A[c/z]}}xy′′)
⇒ τ(c) ∧ ∀y′′ ∈ s1xy{{A[c/z]}}
x
y′′
(IH(i))
⇒ τ(c) ∧ (A[c/z])DN(t1x; y)
DN def.
≡ (∃zτA)DN(c, t1x; y)
Existential quantifier (ii). Let s2, t2 be given by induction hypothesis. Then:
∀y′′ ∈
⋃
y′∈y s2xy
′ (∃zτA)DN(c, x; y
′′)
DN def.
≡ ∀y′′ ∈
⋃
y′∈y s2xy
′ (τ(c) ∧ A[c/z]DN(x; y
′′))
⇒ τ(c) ∧ ∀y′′ ∈
⋃
y′∈y s2xy
′ A[c/z]DN(x; y
′′)
⇒ τ(c) ∧ ∀y′ ∈ y∀y′′ ∈ s2xy
′ A[c/z]DN(x; y
′′)
(IH(ii))
⇒ τ(c) ∧ ∀y′ ∈ y{{A[c/z]}}t2xy′
P 4.3
⇔ {{(∃zτA)}}c,t2xy′′
Implication (i). Let sB
1
, tB
1
and sA
2
, tA
2
be given by induction hypothesis. Then:
∀x′ ∈ {tA2 x}∀w
′ ∈ sB1 ( f x
′)w{{A → B}}
f ,g
x′,w′
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB
1
( f (tA
2
x))w{{A→ B}}
f ,g
tA
2
x,w′
P 4.3
⇔ ∀w′ ∈ sB
1
( f (tA
2
x))w(∀y ∈ g(tA
2
x)w′ {{A}}
tA
2
x
y → {{B}}
f(tA
2
x)
w′ )
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB1 ( f (t
A
2 x))w∀y ∈ g(t
A
2 x)w
′ {{A}}
tA
2
x
y
→ ∀w′ ∈ sB
1
( f (tA
2
x))w{{B}}
f(tA
2
x)
w′
(IH(i),IH(ii))
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB1 ( f (t
A
2 x))w∀y ∈ g(t
A
2 x)w
′∀y′ ∈ sA2 xy ADN(x; y
′)
→ BDN(t
B
1
( f (tA
2
x));w)
⇒ ∀y′ ∈
⋃
w′∈sB
1
( f (tA
2
x))w
⋃
y∈g(tA
2
x)w′ s
A
2
xy ADN(x; y
′)
→ BDN(t
B
1 ( f (t
A
2 x));w)
DN def.
≡ (A → B)DN(t
A→B
1 [ f , g]; x,w)
where tA→B1 [ f , g] ≡ λx,w.
⋃
w′∈sB
1
( f (tA
2
x))w
⋃
y∈g(tA
2
x)w′ s
A
2 xy, λx.t
B
1 ( f (t
A
2 x)).
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Implication (ii). Let sA
1
, tA
1
and sB
2
, tB
2
be given by induction hypothesis. Then:
∀x′ ∈ {tA
1
x}∀w′ ∈ sB
2
( f x′)w(A → B)DN( f , g; x
′,w′)
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))w(A → B)DN( f , g; t
A
1
x,w′)
DN def.
≡ ∀w′ ∈ sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))w(∀y ∈ g(tA
1
x)w′ ADN(t
A
1
x; y)
→ BDN( f (t
A
1 x);w
′))
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))w∀y ∈ g(tA
1
x)w′ ADN(t
A
1
x; y)
→ ∀w′ ∈ sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))wBDN( f (t
A
1
x);w′)
(IH(i),IH(ii))
⇒ ∀w′ ∈ sB2 ( f (t
A
1 x))w∀y ∈ g(t
A
1 x)w
′∀y′ ∈ sA1 xy {{A}}
x
y′
→ {{B}}
tB
2
( f (tA
1
x))
w
⇒ ∀y′ ∈
⋃
w′∈sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))w
⋃
y∈g(tA
1
x)w′ s
A
1
xy {{A}}xy′ → {{B}}
tB
2
( f (tA
1
x))
w
P 4.3
⇔ {{A → B}}
λx,w.
⋃
w′∈sB
2
( f ( tA
1
x))w
⋃
y∈g( tA
1
x)w′
sA
1
xy,λx.tB
2
( f (tA
1
x))
x,w

Remark 4.5 (Stein’s family of interpretations). In [27] Stein describes a family
of interpretations parametrised by a number n. The idea is that when ρ is a type
of type level ≥ n we treat the contraction in a way similar to the Diller-Nahm
interpretation and so bt(ρ) = ρ∗ and ∀x ⊏ρ a A :≡ ∀x ∈ρ range(a) A, where a is
a function from the pure type (n − 1). But when ρ is a type of type level < n we
treat it as modified realizability and therefore bt(ρ) = ε and ∀x ⊏ρ ε A :≡ ∀x
ρA.
Although we could consider combinations of this with the various interpretations
of quantifiers, we will leave this for future work.
Remark 4.6 (Diller-Nahm with majorizability). One could also consider the fol-
lowing choice of parameters
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x = a) τ true ∀x ≤∗τ aA τ ifτ λ f . f
which corresponds to a version of the Diller-Nahm interpretation where set inclu-
sion is replaced by majorizability. Unfortunately this does not seem to lead to a
sound interpretation, and indeed we cannot satisfy condition (Cη), as there is no
term η which satisfies:
∀y ≤∗τ η(z)A[y] ⊢ A[z]
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in It = N-HA
ω for an arbitrary z, since this would imply z ≤∗τ η(z). One could
then try to take {Wτ(x)}τ∈T to be “x is monotone of type τ”, i.e. Wτ(x) = x ≤
∗
τ x,
but in this case the axiom
⊢ Recρ ∈ ρ→ (ρ→ N→ ρ) → N→ ρ
is no longer witnessable, since Rec is not self-majorizing (monotone).
4.2. Interpretations where x≺τ a :≡ x ≤∗τ a
The instances where x≺τ a is chosen to be x ≤∗τ a, with wt(τ) = τ, which we
call bounded interpretations, include the bounded functional interpretation [11],
and the bounded modified realizability [10]. In this case we will also discuss
a new interpretation: the bounded Diller-Nahm interpretation. Let ∀˜xτA be an
abbreviation for ∀xτ(x ≤∗τ x → A).
Bounded modified realizability. Consider this instantiation of the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ ε A bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x ≤∗τ a) τ x ≤
∗
τ x ∀˜x
τA ε maxτ(x, y) λ f . f
Again we see that in ((A))xy the tuple y will be empty and the types bt(τ) can be
omitted.
Proposition 4.7 (Bounded modified realizability, [10]). With the parameters in-
stantiated as above we have:
((A → B)) f ⇔ ∀˜xτ
+
A◦ (((A))x → ((B)) f x)
((A ∧ B))x,v ⇔ ((A))x ∧ ((B))v
((A ∨ B))x,v ⇔ ((A))x ∨ ((B))v
((∃zτA))x,c ⇔ ∃zτ≤∗τ c ((A))
x
((∀zτA)) f ⇔ ∀zτ≤∗τ b ((A))
fb
so that ((A))x can be seen to correspond to x bmr A.
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.4, using the above instantiation of the parame-
ters. 
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Bounded functional interpretation. Consider this instantiation of the parame-
ters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ a A bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x ≤∗τ a) τ x ≤
∗
τ x ∀˜x ≤
∗
τ aA τ maxτ(x, y) λ f . f
Proposition 4.8 (Bounded functional interpretation, [11]). With the parameters
instantiated as above we have:
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀˜y ≤
∗
τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}
b,x,v
y,w ⇔ ∀˜y
′ ≤∗
τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′ ∨ ∀˜w
′ ≤∗
τ−
B•
w {{B}}vw′
{{∃zτA}}
c,x
y ⇔ ∃z ≤
∗
τ c∀˜y
′ ≤∗
τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′
{{∀zτA}}
f
b,y
⇔ ∀zτ ≤∗τ b {{A}}
fb
y
so that {{A}}xy can be seen to correspond to AB(x; y).
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.3. 
Remark 4.9. In order to extend the source theory with bounded quantifiers, in this
case one must add an “intensional” majorizability relation x E y, which satisfies
f E g ⇒ ∀x, y(x E y → ( f x E gy) ∧ ( f x E f y))
with a rule-version of the other direction:
Γ, x E y ⊢ ( f x E gy) ∧ ( f x E f y)
Γ ⊢ f E g
Adding the other direction as an axiom would require us to produce a majorant
for arbitrary x’s and y’s, which we do not have in It = N-HA
ω.
Bounded Diller-Nahm interpretation. Let us consider now what we believe is
another novel functional interpretation of WE-HAω, where contraction is treated
like in the Diller-Nahm interpretation (via finite sets), but the typing axioms are
treated as in the bounded interpretations (via majorizability). As above, we are
considering Is = WE-HA
ω and It = N-HA
ω, but consider the following instan-
tiation of the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ a A bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ
τ(x) ∧ (x ≤∗τ a) τ x ≤
∗
τ x ∀˜x ∈τ aA τ
∗ maxτ(x, y) λ f . f
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With these parameters the {{·}}-interpretation becomes:
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ≡ ∀˜y ∈τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ≡ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}
x,v
y,w ≡ ∀˜y
′ ∈τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′ ∨ ∀˜w
′ ∈τ−
B•
w {{B}}vw′
{{∃zτA}}
c,x
y ≡ ∃z ≤
∗
τ c∀˜y
′ ∈τ−
A•
y{{A}}xy′
{{∀zτA}}
f
b,y
≡ ∀z ≤∗τ b {{A}}
fb
y
Proposition 4.10 (Bounded Diller-Nahm interpretation). The derived functional
interpretation above is a sound interpretation ofWE-HAω.
Proof. In order to prove the soundness for the interpretation it is enough to show
that this choice of parameters satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.9, i.e. that
(i) the corresponding AL parameters, x ≺τ• a, W
•
τ(x) and ∀x
•
⊏ τ a A, are an
adequate choice for the formulas |A|xy , for all A in I
•
s , and
(ii) all the non-logical axioms of Is are {{·}}-witnessable in It.
SinceW•τ(x) is the assumption that x is self-majorizing (i.e. monotone), conditions
(WS), (WK), (WAp) easily follow. (Q1) and (Q2) are also straightforward. The
conditions for validating “contraction” (Cη), (C⊔), (C◦) hold by taking η(x) = {x}
and y1 ⊔ y2 = y1 ∪ y2 and f ◦ z = ∪x∈z f x as indeed we have:
(Cη) (z ≤
∗ z), ∀˜y ∈ {z}A[y] ⊢At A[z]
(C⊔) ∀˜y ∈ y1 ∪ y2A[y] ⊢At ∀˜y ∈ y1A[y] ∧ ∀˜y ∈ y2A[y]
(C◦) ∀˜y ∈ ∪x∈z f xA[y] ⊢At ∀˜x ∈ z ∀˜y ∈ f x A[y]
That concludes the proof that the choice of parameters is an adequate choice for
the formulas |A|xy , for all A in I
•
s . We must also show that the non-logical axioms
of Is are {{·}}-witnessable in It. This can be done by verifying that the assumptions
(A6), (A7) and (A8) can be satisfied by appropriate terms, which is straightfor-
ward (similar to the bounded interpretations). 
Remark 4.11. It could turn out, however, that this “Bounded Diller-Nahm inter-
pretation” is actually equivalent (in the sense of having the same characterising
principles) as the Diller-Nahm interpretation or the bounded functional interpre-
tation. This is still open. But we suspect this will not be the case, since being a
member of a finite set is strictly stronger than being majorized by some element.
More precisely, from x ∈τ a we indeed have x ≤
∗ max a. But from the assump-
tion x ≤∗τ a we cannot in general find a finite set a˜ (depending only on a) such
that x ∈ a˜. This should be settled once we have investigated the characterising
principles of this new interpretation, which we plan to do in a follow up paper.
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4.3. Interpretations where x≺τ a :≡ x ∈τ a
The instances where x ≺τ a is chosen to be x ∈τ a, with wt(τ) = τ
∗ and
mN
P
( f )(a) =
⋃
{ f z : z ∈ a}, which we call Herbrand interpretations, give some
new interpretations forWE-HAω which are related with recently developed func-
tional interpretations for nonstandard arithmetic [3]. In fact, to obtain the latter
interpretations one needs to consider two types of predicate symbols, as explained
in Section 5.
Herbrand realizability (for IL). Consider the following instantiation of the pa-
rameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ ε A bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ ( f )(a)
τ(x) ∧ (x ∈τ a) τ
∗ true ∀xτA ε x ∪ y
⋃
z∈a
f z
Again we see that in ((A))xy the tuple y will be empty and hence we omit it.
Proposition 4.12 (Herbrand realizability). With the parameters instantiated as
above we have:
((A → B)) f ⇔ ∀xτ
+
A◦ (((A))x → ((B)) f x)
((A ∧ B))x,v ⇔ ((A))x ∧ ((B))v
((A ∨ B))x,v,b ⇔ B(b) ∧ ((b = T → ((A))x) ∧ (b = F → ((B))v))
((∃zτA))x,c ⇔ ∃z ∈τ c((A))
x
((∀zτA)) f ⇔ ∀z ∈τ b((A))
fb
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.4, using the above instantiation of the parame-
ters. 
Herbrand Diller-Nahm interpretation. Consider the following instantiation of
the parameters:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ ( f )(a)
τ(x) ∧ (x ∈τ a) τ
∗ true ∀x ∈τ aA τ
∗ x ∪ y
⋃
z∈a
f z
Proposition 4.13 (Herbrand Diller-Nahm interpretation). With the parameters in-
stantiated as above we have:
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{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀y ∈τ+
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}x,vy,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}
b,x,v
y,w ⇔ ∀y
′ ∈τ+
A•
y {{A}}xy′ ∨ ∀w
′ ∈τ+
B•
w {{B}}vw′
{{∃zτA}}xy ⇔ ∃z ∈τ c∀y
′ ∈τ+
A•
y {{A}}xy′
{{∀zτA}}x
b,y
⇔ ∀z ∈τ b{{A}}
x
y
and this is a sound interpretation ofWE-HAω.
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.3, using the above instantiation of the parame-
ters. 
The Herbrand realizability for intuitionistic logic given by Proposition 4.12
and the Herbrand Diller-Nahm interpretation given by Proposition 4.13 are in a
sense ”rediscovered” interpretations. In fact, these interpretations are closely re-
lated with the interpretations given in [3] forWE-HAωst. They are also closely con-
nected with the interpretation for “pure logic” considered by Gilda Ferreira and
Fernando Ferreira in the paper [8]. Moreover, Fernando Ferreira has a preprint
[7] where he considers essentially the Herbrand Diller-Nahm interpretation for
WE-HAω as well as an extension to second order arithmetic.
Our parametrised interpretations allow us to consider also a Herbrand version
of the bounded functional interpretation.
Herbrandized bfi. We conclude this list of instantiations with what we believe
is yet another novel functional interpretation of WE-HAω, where contraction is
treated like the Herbrandized interpretations, but the typing axioms are treated as
in the bounded interpretations:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ ( f )(a)
τ(x) ∧ (x ∈τ a) τ
∗ x ≤∗τ x ∀˜x ≤
∗
τ a A τ x ∪ y
⋃
z∈a
f z
Proposition 4.14 (Herbrandized bounded functional interpretation ofWE-HAω).
With the parameters instantiated as above we have:
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w ⇔ ∀˜y ≤
∗
τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w ⇔ {{A}}
x
y ∧ {{B}}
v
w
{{A ∨ B}}x,vy,w ⇔ ∀˜y
′ ≤∗
τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′ ∨ ∀˜w
′ ≤∗
τ−
B•
w {{B}}vw′
{{∃zτA}}
c,x
y ⇔ ∃z ∈τ c∀˜y
′ ≤∗
τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′
{{∀zτA}}
f
b,y
⇔ ∀z ∈τ b {{A}}
fb
y
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and this is a sound interpretation ofWE-HAω.
Proof. It is easy to check that these equivalences hold, by applying Proposition 3.3
using the above instantiation of the parameters. That this is a sound interpretation,
then follows by verifying assumption (A1)-(A8), which is quite straightforward
and follows the same patterns as in the previous instances. 
A remark similar to Remark 4.11 also applies here. We suspect that this is a
new interpretation, but will only be certain once we have investigated its charac-
terising principles.
Remark 4.15 (A Herbrandized Dialectica). One might also consider an instanti-
ation of the parameters as follows:
x≺τ a wt(τ) Wτ(x) ∀x⊏τ aA bt(τ) m
B
τ (b, x, y) m
N
τ ( f )(a)
τ(x) ∧ (x ∈τ a) τ
∗ true A[a/x] τ x ∪ y
⋃
z∈a
f z
which would correspond to a “Herbrandized” version of the Dialectica interpre-
tation. In this case contraction is dealt with in a precise way, but quantifiers are
approximated by finite sets. In WE-HAω, however, where definition by cases is
available, it’s easy to check that this would give rise to an interpretation which is
equivalent to the original Dialectica, since the interpretation of the quantifiers
{{∃zτA}}c,xy ⇔ ∃z ∈τ c {{A}}
x
y
{{∀zτA}}
f
y,c ⇔ ∀z ∈τ c {{A}}
fc
y
can be effectively replaced by precise witnesses
{{∃zτA}}
c,x
y ⇔ {{A[c/z]}}
x
y
{{∀zτA}}
f
y,c ⇔ {{A[c/z]}}
fc
y
5. Final Remarks
We have described above a general framework for unifying several functional
interpretation, which we then used to discover new interpretations. These are
summarised in Figure 2.
A notable family of functional interpretations that we are not covering in this
paper is Kohlenbach’s monotone functional interpretations (see [18, 19]). We fo-
cus here on the different ways a formula can be given a functional interpretation.
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wt(τ) x≺τ a mBτ (b, x, y) / m
N
τ ( f , a) bt(τ) ∀x⊏τ a A Wτ(x) Interpretation
τ x =τ a ifτ(b, x, y) / f (a) τ A[a/x] true Dialectica
τ x =τ a ifτ(b, x, y) / f (a) ε ∀x
τA true Modified realizability
τ x =τ a ifτ(b, x, y) / f (a) τ ∀x ≤
∗
τ aA true / x ≤
∗
τ x (combination not sound)
τ x =τ a ifτ(b, x, y) / f (a) τ
∗ ∀x ∈τ aA true Diller-Nahm
τ x ≤∗τ a maxτ(x, y) / f (a) τ A[a/x] x ≤
∗
τ x (combination not sound)
τ x ≤∗τ a maxτ(x, y) / f (a) ε ∀˜x
τA x ≤∗τ x Bounded modified realizability
τ x ≤∗τ a maxτ(x, y) / f (a) τ ∀˜x ≤
∗
τ aA x ≤
∗
τ x Bounded functional interpretation
τ x ≤∗τ a maxτ(x, y) / f (a) τ
∗ ∀˜x ∈τ aA x ≤
∗ x Bounded Diller-Nahm
τ∗ x ∈τ a x ∪ y /
⋃
z∈a
f z τ A[a/x] true Herbrand Dialectica ( ≃ Dialectica)
τ∗ x ∈τ a x ∪ y /
⋃
z∈a
f z ε ∀xτA true Herbrand realizability (for IL)
τ∗ x ∈τ a x ∪ y /
⋃
z∈a
f z τ ∀˜x ≤∗τ aA x ≤
∗
τ x Herbrandized bfi
τ∗ x ∈τ a x ∪ y /
⋃
z∈a
f z τ∗ ∀x ∈τ aA true Herbrand Diller-Nahm
Figure 2: Summary of instantiations (with the two novel interpretations in bold)
The monotone functional interpretation in fact makes use of these same interpre-
tations of formulas, but with a different interpretation of proofs. More precisely,
given the interpretation of a formula A as |A|xy , we are focusing here on the sound-
ness theorem that guarantees the existence of terms t such that |A|ty for provable
A. In the monotone functional interpretation a different soundness proof is used,
which, for provable A, guarantees the existence of terms t˜ such that ∃x ≤∗ t˜ |A|xy ,
where ≤∗ is Bezem’s strong majorizability relation. Hence, one could consider
“monotone” soundness theorems for each of the interpretations discussed here,
but we leave this to future work.
As shown in the previous section, the parametrised interpretations presented
in this paper can be used as a way to discover new interpretations. The instances
that we considered are by no means exhaustive. For instance, we think that the
interpretations for nonstandard arithmetic from [3, 6, 9] should also fit in our
framework. The idea is to consider not just the typing predicate symbols τ(x), but
also the standard predicate symbol st(x) as computational symbols, giving rise to
the parameters x≺τ a and x≺st a, which each can be given a different interpretation
(on top of the choice of interpreting contraction via ∀x ⊏ a A). Suitable choices
for these should lead to the known interpretations of nonstandard arithmetic, but
might also give rise to new interpretations for nonstandard arithmetic. This study,
however, goes behind the scope of this paper.
Another question concerns variants with truth [14]. We think that it may be
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possible to obtain the existing interpretations with truth, and maybe to find new
ones, using our parametrised interpretations, by changing the interpretation of !A
in Definition 2.4 to |!A|xa :≡!∀y⊏ a |A|
x
y ⊗ !A. We also leave this to future work.
Usually, functional interpretations are accompanied by a characterisation the-
orem where one shows the equivalence between a formula and its interpretation.
In order to show such equivalence one requires some principles – typically, a form
of Choice and of Markov’s principle are among such principles – which are called
the characteristic principles of the interpretation. In the case of our parametrised
interpretation we do not know if such a (parametric) theorem holds. We were
able to define parametrised characteristic principles and obtain the result but only
assuming that the characteristic principles are interpretable (by themselves). This
does not solve the problem since it may happen that the theory with the princi-
ples may not be consistent. However, for each particular instantiation described
in this paper the parametrised characteristic principles indeed correspond to the
actual characteristic principles of the interpretation obtained with that instantia-
tion. So, it seems that if the resulting theory is consistent, then the parametrised
interpretation admits a characterisation theorem.
Finally, it is well-known that intuitionistic functional interpretations are re-
lated with classical ones by means of a negative translation. For example, as
shown in [1, 28], Jean-Louis Krivine’s negative translation is the correct tool to
connect Go¨del’s Dialectica with Shoenfield’s interpretation. Other factorisations
were obtained in [5, 13, 28, 26]. It is our impression that composing our in-
tuitionistic parametrised interpretation with various negative translations would
entail parametrised classical interpretations that allows one to obtain all the stan-
dard interpretations for classical logic, showing factorisations are a general feature
among functional interpretations. We also leave this to a future study.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3.3
Straightforward by simply unfolding definitions:
If A = P(x) and P is a computational predicate symbol then:
{{P(x)}}a
D3.2
⇔ (|(P(x))•|a)F
D1.3
⇔ (|P(x)|a)F
D2.4
⇔ (x ≺P• a)
F
D1.6
⇔ x≺Pa
If A = P(x) and P is a non-computational predicate symbol then:
{{P(x)}}
D3.2
⇔ (|(P(x))•|)F
D1.3
⇔ (|P(x)|)F
D2.4
⇔ (P(x))F
D1.6
⇔ P(x)
Implication.
{{A → B}}
f ,g
x,w
D3.2
⇔ (|(A → B)•|
f ,g
x,w)
F
D1.3
⇔ (|!A• ⊸ B•|
f ,g
x,w)
F
D2.4
⇔ (!∀y
•
⊏ τ−
A•
gxw |A•|xy ⊸ |B
•|
f x
w )
F
D3.1
⇔ (!(∀y⊏τ−
A•
gxw (|A•|xy)
F )• ⊸ |B•|
f x
w )
F
D1.6
⇔ ∀y⊏τ−
A•
gxw (|A•|xy)
F → (|B•|
f x
w )
F
D3.2
⇔ ∀y⊏τ−
A•
gxw {{A}}xy → {{B}}
f x
w
Conjunction.
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w
D3.2
⇔ (|(A ∧ B)•|x,vy,w)
F
D1.3
⇔ (|A• ⊗ B•|x,vy,w)
F
D2.4
⇔ (|A•|xy ⊗ |B
•|vw)
F
D1.6
⇔ (|A•|xy)
F ∧ (|B•|vw)
F
D3.2
⇔ {{A}}xy ∧ {{B}}
v
w
Disjunction. Recall that A ∨ B is defined as ∃zB(((z = T) → A) ∧ ((z = F) → B))
(Proposition 1.7). Hence
{{A ∨ B}}
b,x,v
y,w
D3.2
⇔ (|(A ∨ B)•|
b,x,v
y,w )
F
D1.3
⇔ (|∃zB((!(z = T)⊸!A•) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸!B•))|
b,x,v
y,w )
F
D2.4
⇔ (∃z ≺B• b((!(z = T)⊸!∀y
′
•
⊏ τ−
A•
y |A•|xy′ ) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸!∀w
′
•
⊏ τ−
B•
w |B•|vw′ )))
F
D1.6
⇔ ∃z≺B b((z = T → ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y (|A•|xy′ )
F ) ∧ (z = F → ∀w′⊏τ−
B•
w (|B•|vw′)
F ))
D3.2
⇔ ∃z≺B b((z = T → ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′ ) ∧ (z = F → ∀w
′
⊏τ−
B•
w {{B}}vw′ ))
Existential quantifier.
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{{∃zA}}xy
D3.2
⇔ (|(∃zA)• |xy)
F
D1.3
⇔ (|∃z!A• |xy)
F
D2.4
⇔ (∃z!∀y′
•
⊏ τ−
A•
y |A•|xy′)
F
D1.6
⇔ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y (|A•|xy′)
F
D3.2
⇔ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy′
Universal quantifier.
{{∀zA}}xy
D3.2
⇔ (|(∀zA)• |xy)
F
D1.3
⇔ (|∀zA•|xy)
F
D2.4
⇔ (∀z|A•|xy)
F
D1.6
⇔ ∀z(|A•|xy)
F
D3.2
⇔ ∀z{{A}}xy
Relativised (computational) existential quantifier.
{{∃zPA}}c,xy
N1.2
⇔ {{∃z(P(z) ∧ A)}}c,xy
D3.2
⇔ (|(∃z(P(z) ∧ A))•|c,xy )
F
D1.3
⇔ (|∃z!((P(z))∗ ⊗ A•)|c,xy )
F
D2.4
⇔ (∃z!∀y′
•
⊏ τ−
A•
y ((z ≺P• c) ⊗ |A
•|xy′))
F
D1.6
⇔ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y ((z≺P c) ∧ (|A•|xy)
F )
(IH)
⇔ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y ((z≺P c) ∧ {{A}}xy)
(Q3)
⇔ ∃z≺P c∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}xy
Relativised (computational) universal quantifier.
{{∀zPA}}
f
y,b
N1.2
⇔ {{∀z(P(z) → A)}}
f
y,b
D3.2
⇔ (|(∀z(P(z) → A))•|
f
y,b
)F
D1.3
⇔ (|∀z(!P(z)⊸ A•)|
f
y,b
)F
D2.4
⇔ (∀z(!(z ≺P• b)⊸ |A
•|
fb
y )
F
D1.6
⇔ ∀z≺P b (|A•|
fb
y )
F
D3.2
⇔ ∀z≺P b {{A}}
fb
y
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3.4
Straightforward by simply unfolding definitions:
If A = P(x) with P a computational predicate symbol then
((P(x)))a
D3.2
≡ (|(P(x))◦|a)F
D1.3
≡ (|!P(x)|a)F
D2.4
≡ (!(x ≺P◦ a))
F D1.6≡ x≺P a
If A = P(x) with P a non-computational predicate symbol then
((P(x)))
D3.2
≡ (|(P(x))◦|)F
D1.3
≡ (|!P(x)|)F
D2.4
≡ (!P(x))F
D1.6
≡ P(x)
Implication.
((A → B))
f ,g
x,w
D3.2
≡ (|(A → B)◦|
f ,g
x,w)
F
D1.3
≡ (|!(A◦ ⊸ B◦)|
f ,g
x,w)
F
D2.4
≡ (!∀x′,w′
◦
⊏ τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w (|A◦|x
′
gx′w′ ⊸ |B
◦|
f x′
w′ ))
F
D1.6
≡ ∀x′,w′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w ((|A◦|x
′
gx′w′)
F → (|B◦|
f x′
w′ )
F )
D3.2
≡ ∀x′,w′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w (((A))x
′
gx′w′ → ((B))
f x′
w′ )
Conjunction.
{{A ∧ B}}
x,v
y,w
D3.2
≡ (|(A ∧ B)◦|x,vy,w)
F
D1.3
≡ (|A◦ ⊗ B◦)|x,vy,w)
F
D2.4
≡ (|A◦|xy ⊗ |B
◦|vw)
F D1.6≡ (|A◦|xy)
F ∧ (|B◦|vw)
F D3.2≡ ((A))xy ∧ ((B))
v
w
Disjunction.
((A ∨ B))x,v,by,w
D3.2
≡ (|(A ∨ B)◦|x,v,by,w )
F
D1.3
≡ (|∃zB((!(z = T)⊸ A◦) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸ B◦))|x,v,by,w )
F
D2.4
≡ (∃z ≺B◦ b((!(z = T)⊸ |A
◦|xy) ⊗ (!(z = F)⊸ |B
◦|vw)))
F
D1.6
≡ ∃z≺B b((z = T→ (|A◦|xy)
F ) ∧ (z = F → (|B◦|vw)
F ))
D3.2
≡ ∃z≺B b((z = T→ ((A))xy ) ∧ (z = F → ((B))
v
w))
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Existential quantifier.
((∃zA))xy
D3.2
≡ (|(∃zA)◦ |xy)
F D1.3≡ (|∃zA◦|xy)
F D2.4≡ (∃z|A◦|xy)
F D1.6≡ ∃z(|A◦|xy)
F D3.2≡ ∃z((A))xy
Universal quantifier.
((∀zA))xy
D3.2
≡ (|(∀zA)◦ |xy)
F
D1.3
≡ (|!∀zA◦ |xy)
F
D2.4
≡ (!∀y′
◦
⊏ τ−
A◦
y∀z|A◦|xy′)
F
D1.6
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∀z(|A◦|xy′)
F
D3.2
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∀z((A))xy′
Relativised (computational) existential quantifier.
((∃zPA))x,cy
N1.2
≡ ((∃z(P(z) ∧ A)))x,cy
D3.2
≡ (|(∃z(P(z) ∧ A))◦|x,cy )
F
D1.3
≡ (|∃z(!P(z) ⊗ A◦)|x,cy )
F
D2.4
≡ (∃z((z ≺P◦ c) ⊗ |A
◦|xy))
F
D1.6
≡ ∃z≺P c (|A◦|xy)
F
D3.2
≡ ∃z≺P c ((A))xy
Relativised (computational) universal quantifier.
((∀zPA))
f
c,y
N1.2
≡ ((∀z(P(z) → A)))
f
c,y
D3.2
≡ (|(∀z(P(z) → A))◦|
f
c,y)
F
D1.3
≡ (|!∀z!(!P(z) ⊸ A◦)|
f
c,y)
F
D2.4
≡ (!∀c′, y′
◦
⊏wt(P),bt(τ)−
A
c, y∀z!∀c′′, y′′
◦
⊏ τ−
A◦
c′, y′ (!(z ≺P◦ c)⊸ |A
◦|
fc′′
y′′ ))
F
(Q4)
≡ (!∀c′, y′
◦
⊏wt(P),bt(τ)−
A
c, y !∀c′′, y′′
◦
⊏ τ−
A◦
c′, y′ ∀z(!(z ≺P◦ c
′′)⊸ |A◦|
fc′′
y′′ ))
F
D1.6
≡ ∀c′, y′⊏wt(P),bt(τ)−
A◦
c, y∀c′′, y′′⊏τ−
A◦
c′, y′ ∀z≺P c′′ (|A◦|
fc′′
y′′ )
F
D3.2
≡ ∀c′, y′⊏wt(P),bt(τ)−
A◦
c, y∀c′′, y′′⊏τ−
A◦
c′, y′ ∀z≺P c′′ ((A))
f c′′
y′′
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3.14
We will first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. For each formula A of ILω there exists a tuple of closed terms a such
that
⊢ILω Wτ+
A◦
→bt(τ−
A◦
)→τ−
A◦
(a) and Wτ+
A◦
,bt(τ−
A◦
)(x, y), ((A))
x
axy ⊢ILω ∀y
′
⊏τ−
A◦
y ((A))xy′
Proof. By induction on the complexity of the formula A. The only non-trivial
case is when A is an existential formula ∃zA: Assume a is the witness for A, and
Wτ+
(∃zA)◦
,bt(τ−
(∃zA)◦
)(x, y), then, by definition, we have Wτ+
A◦
,bt(τ−
A◦
)(x, y) and hence
((∃zA))xaxy
P3.4
⇔ ∃z((A))xaxy
(IH)
⇒ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y ((A))xy′
(Q5)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∃z((A))xy′
P3.4
⇔ ∀y′⊏τ−
(∃zA)◦
y ((∃zA))xy′
All other cases follow directly from our assumption (C◦). For instance, writing id
for the identity function, for implication A → B we have:
((A → B))
f ,g
id◦(x,w)
P3.4
⇔ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
id ◦ (x,w) (((A))x
′′
gx′′w′′ → ((B))
f x′′
w′′ )
(C◦)
⇒ ∀x′,w′⊏bt(τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
) x,w∀x
′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x′,w′ (((A))x
′′
gx′′w′′ → ((B))
f x′′
w′′ )
P3.4
⇔ ∀x′,w′⊏τ−
(A→B)◦
x,w ((A → B))
f ,g
x′,w′
since τ−
(A→B)◦
= bt(τ+
A◦
, τ−
B◦
). 
We then prove points (i) and (ii) simultaneously by induction on the complex-
ity of the formula A, using Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. The only non-trivial cases
are the cases of implication and the quantifiers, so we will focus on these cases.
During the proof we will make use of our assumptions (C◦) and (Cη), which only
hold when the terms in question are in W. This will be the case, however, since
by induction hypothesis, the terms we are working with are already in W, and the
free-variables are also assumed to be in W. The constructed terms will then be
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guaranteed to be in W (point (iii)) by Lemma 2.1.
Universal quantifier (i). Let s1, t1 be given by induction hypothesis, and assume
Wτ+
(∀zA)•
,τ−
(∀zA)◦
(x, y), i.e. Wτ+
A•
,bt(τ−
A◦
)(x, y). Then:
∀y′⊏τ−
(∀zA)•
(s1x) ◦ y {{∀zA}}
x
y′
P3.3
⇔ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
(s1x) ◦ y∀z{{A}}
x
y′
(C◦)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∀y′′⊏τ−
A•
s1xy
′ ∀z{{A}}xy′′
(Q4)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∀z∀y′′⊏τ−
A•
s1xy
′ {{A}}xy′′
(IH(i))
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
y∀z((A))t1xy′
P3.4
⇔ ((∀zA))t1xy
Universal quantifier (ii). Let s2, t2 be given by induction hypothesis, and assume
Wτ+
(∀zA)◦
,τ−
(∀zA)•
(x, y). Then:
((∀zA))x
η(s2xy)
P3.4
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
A◦
η(s2xy)∀z((A))
x
y′
(Cη)
⇒ ∀z((A))xs2xy
(IH(ii))
⇒ ∀z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y {{A}}t2xy′
(Q4)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y∀z{{A}}
t2x
y′
P3.3
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
(∀zA)•
y {{∀zA}}
t2x
y
Existential quantifier (i). Let s1, t1 be given by induction hypothesis and assume
Wτ+
(∃zA)•
,τ−
(∃zA)◦
(x, y). Then:
∀y′⊏τ−
(∃zA)•
η(s1xy) {{∃zA}}
x
y′
P3.3
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
η(s1xy)∃z∀y
′′
⊏τ−
A•
y′ {{A}}xy′′
(Cη)
⇒ ∃z∀y′⊏τ−
A•
s1xy {{A}}
x
y′
(IH(i))
⇒ ∃z((A))t1xy
P3.4
≡ ((∃zA))t1xy
Existential quantifier (ii). Let a be as in Lemma 5.1, and s2, t2 be given by induc-
tion hypothesis and assume Wτ+
(∃zA)◦
,τ−
(∃zA)•
(x, y), then:
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((∃zA))x
ax((λy.η(s2xy))◦y)
L 5.1
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
∃zA
(λy.η(s2xy)) ◦ y ((∃zA))
x
y′
(C◦)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y∀y′′⊏τ−
(∃zA)◦
η(s2xy
′) ((∃zA))xy′′
P3.4
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y∀y′′⊏τ−
A◦
η(s2xy
′)∃z((A))xy′′
(Cη)
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y∃z((A))xs2xy′
(IH(ii))
⇒ ∀y′⊏τ−
A•
y∃z∀y′′⊏τ−
A•
y′ {{A}}t2xy′′
P3.3
≡ ∀y′⊏τ−
(∃zA)•
y {{∃zA}}t2xy′
Implication (i). Let sB1 , t
B
1 , s
A
2 , t
A
2 be given by induction hypothesis. Assume that
Wτ+
(A→B)•
( f , g) and Wτ−
(A→B)◦
(x,w). Then
∀x′,w′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
(λu, v.η(tA
2
u), sB
1
( f (t2u))v) ◦ (x,w) {{A → B}}
f ,g
x′ ,w′
(C◦)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w∀x′,w′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
η(tA
2
x′′), sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′ {{A → B}}
f ,g
x′ ,w′
(Cη)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w∀w′⊏τ−
B•
sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′ {{A → B}}
f ,g
tA
2
x′′ ,w′
P3.3
⇔ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w∀w′⊏τ−
B•
sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′
(∀y⊏τ−
A•
g(tA
2
x′′)w′ {{A}}
tA
2
x′′
y → {{B}}
f (tA
2
x′′)
w′ )
(Q1)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w
(∀w′⊏τ−
B•
sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′ ∀y⊏τ−
A•
g(tA
2
x′′)w′ {{A}}
tA
2
x′′
y
→ ∀w′⊏τ−
B•
sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′ {{B}}
f(tA
2
x′′)
w′ )
(C◦)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w
(∀y⊏τ−
A•
g(tA
2
x′′) ◦ (sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′) {{A}}
tA
2
x′′
y
→ ∀w′⊏τ−
B•
sB
1
( f (t2x
′′))w′′ {{B}}
f(tA
2
x′′)
w′ )
(IH(i),IH(ii))
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
x,w (((A))x
′′
sA
2
x′′((g(tA
2
x′′))◦(sB
1
( f (tA
2
x′′))w′′))
→ ((B))
tB
1
( f (tA
2
x′′))
w′′ )
P3.4
⇔ ((A→ B))
λx′ ,w′ .sA
2
x′((g(tA
2
x′))◦(sB
1
( f (tA
2
x′))w′)),λx′ .tB
1
( f (tA
2
x′))
x,w
Implication (ii). Let sA
1
, tA
1
, sB
2
, tB
2
be given by induction hypothesis, and let r[x,w] =
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sB
2
( f (tA
1
x))(η(w)). Assume Wτ+
(A→B)◦
,τ−
(A→B)•
(x, y). Then
((A→ B))
f ,g
λ(x′,w′).η(tA
1
x′),η(r[x′,w′])◦(x′,w′)
P3.4
≡ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
λ(x′,w′).η(tA
1
x′), η(r[x′,w′]) ◦ (x′,w′) (((A))x
′′
gx′′w′′ → ((B))
fx′′
w′ )
(C◦)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
x′,w′ ∀x,w⊏τ+
A◦
,τ−
B◦
η(tA
1
x′′), η(r[x′′,w′′]) (((A))xgxw → ((B))
fx
w )
(Cη)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
x′,w′ (((A))
tA
1
x′′
g(tA
1
x′′)(r[x′′ ,w′′])
→ ((B))
f(tA
1
x′′)
r[x′′ ,w′′]
)
(IH(i),IH(ii))
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
x′,w′ (∀y′⊏τ−
A•
sA
1
x′′(g(tA
1
x′′)(r[x′′,w′′]) {{A}}x
′′
y′
→ ∀w⊏τ−
B•
η(w′′) {{B}}
tB
2
( f (tA
1
x′′))
w )
(Cη)
⇒ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ+
A•
,τ−
B•
x′,w′ (∀y′⊏τ−
A•
sA
1
x′′(g(tA
1
x′′)(r[x′′,w′′])) {{A}}x
′′
y′
→ {{B}}
tB
2
( f (tA
1
x′′))
w′′ )
P3.3
≡ ∀x′′,w′′⊏τ−
(A→B)•
, x
′,w′ {{A → B}}
λx,w.sA
1
x(g(tA
1
x)(r[x,w])),λx.tB
2
( f (tA
1
x))
x′′ ,w′′
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